Road Safety Since 2010

Lucy Amos & David Davies, PACTS
Tanya Fosdick, Road Safety Analysis
September 2015
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Disclaimer

This report has been prepared by Lucy Amos, David Davies & Tanya Fosdick. Any errors or omissions are the author’s sole responsibility. The report content reflects the views of the author and not necessarily those of the RAC Foundation.

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Foreword

The last five years in road safety can be described as a time of significant change.

In this report PACTS, supported by the RAC Foundation, sets out the major changes in strategy, actions, resources, road casualties and research since 2010.

Powers and responsibilities have been devolved, and localism has prevailed. There is now significant diversity across the UK, both in the approach taken to delivering road safety and the resources available for doing so.

The progress made in cutting death and injury on the roads has varied markedly across the UK. While the general trend has been downwards, this has masked national and regional variations. And this downward trend has been flattening out.

The Coalition Government was reluctant to set road safety targets, whilst many local authorities experienced cuts to the resources made available for road safety. Now is a good time to take stock of their effects. The views of local authorities surveyed for this report, reproduced in full in Appendix B, are instructive.

The good news is that leadership, activity and research in road safety is being undertaken increasingly by organisations other than central government. These are green shoots which need to be nurtured. A further encouraging development is the commitment of the newly established Highways England to an ambitious target for casualty reduction, and a new intelligence-led approach to safety management of the strategic road network, underpinned by substantial funding.

Already the Conservative Government has made it clear that the trend towards greater devolution is set to continue, with increased powers for Scotland and Wales, and for local authorities in England. Further cuts in public spending are also planned and seem bound to affect road safety.

The challenge for government is to deliver legislative change in those areas where it alone has the mandate and authority; to take the lead in demonstrating that road safety should be a priority for government at all levels; and to support and co-ordinate – but not stifle – the efforts of those delivering road safety initiatives.
The Conservative Party’s Manifesto for the May 2015 General Election included a commitment to “reduce the number of cyclists and other road users killed or injured on our roads every year”. There is much to be done, and no room for complacency.

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Executive Summary

The period 2010-15 has seen significant change in many areas of public policy. Notable amongst these are spending cuts, increased devolution and, in England, a move away from target-setting towards greater autonomy for local authorities (‘localism’). These changes have profoundly affected road safety.

This report summarises the development of road safety strategy and its implementation and outcomes since 2010. It is based on key documents, government statistics, workshops with a range of stakeholders, and a survey of local authorities in England, outside London.

It considers the UK Government’s special roles with regard to road safety, particularly for leadership, strategy and resources. It recognises that road safety is the responsibility of a range of bodies, including the devolved administrations and local authorities, and that the private and voluntary sectors play increasingly important roles.

Its purpose is to provide an evidence base for the incoming Conservative Government which will need to draw up a new road safety strategy and action plan. The report does not, however, prescribe these policies.

The research shows the diversity of approach to road safety strategy across the UK. The UK Coalition Government chose not to set national casualty reduction targets and focused instead on its own direct responsibilities, particularly enforcement powers and driver education. This is the context for local authorities in England outside London, where approximately two thirds have set their own road safety targets. The Government did, however, set a casualty reduction target for Highways England to achieve for the strategic road network. In other parts of the UK, the governments and devolved administrations have adopted road safety targets, endorsed the Safe System approach, published detailed action plans and engaged more directly in delivery at the local level. This distinction in approach is partly the result of differences in policy, and partly a reflection of scale and the allocation of roles.

The UK Government’s less prescriptive approach to leadership and strategy, coupled with reductions in budgets, was seen as having a negative impact on road safety in England by the majority of stakeholders and local authorities in this research.

In terms of actions to deliver improved road safety, there was support for the new enforcement legislation, particularly in drink- and drug-driving, but concern that the lack of priority and resources for roads policing would reduce the effectiveness of the measures.
There was also disappointment regarding what some saw as opportunities missed, particularly the absence of the promised Green Paper on young driver safety. However, the UK situation is not uniform: Scotland has reduced the drink-drive limit and Northern Ireland has moved closer to introducing a lower limit and also to introducing a form of graduated driver licensing for younger drivers.

Since 2010 reported road deaths and serious injuries have declined across the UK, but more slowly than in the previous few years. By 2014 there had been a 19% reduction in the number of people killed or seriously injured in the UK relative to the average for 2005–9. Most of this reduction took place between 2007 and 2010, while 2011 and 2014 experienced increases on the previous year.

Casualty trends vary across the UK. In London the number of people killed or seriously injured declined by 40%; in Northern Ireland by 34% and in Scotland by 31%. England (excluding London) and Wales saw below-average reductions of 17% and 6% respectively. Casualties declined over this period for all major road user groups except for cyclists, where the number seriously injured (but not killed) increased.

Despite the decline in overall casualties, over half of the English local authorities that responded stated that the trends in casualties and safety indicators in their area have been negative (i.e. the situation has worsened) since 2010. Almost two thirds of respondents were negative or strongly negative about the overall changes in road safety since 2010.

The trends show that Great Britain is, broadly, on track to reach the 2020 casualty projections in the Government’s Strategic Framework; with the possible exception of Wales, the devolved administrations are likely to meet the targets set by themselves. However, these were made much more achievable by large falls in the period 2007–10, before the present strategies were adopted. The 5% increase in the number of people killed or seriously injured in Great Britain in 2014 makes this trend less certain.

Many stakeholders are keen to play their part in improving road safety. Their demands were for leadership and coordination from government, underpinned by evidence, resources and research.

PACTS and the RAC Foundation hope that the new government will take the opportunity to reflect on the issues raised in this report, conduct its own review of progress, and work with all willing parties to develop an ambitious new road safety strategy for the next five years or more.
1. Introduction

The UK has a long-standing reputation for very good performance in the field of road safety, and over the years has implemented a range of actions which have led to its position at or near the top of the world rankings in terms of fewest road deaths per million population. This has been achieved by evidence-led engineering, enforcement and education measures, underpinned by long-term targets, strategies and funding.

The UK has reached a critical juncture in road safety, where the major gains of many overarching schemes have been achieved and new means of innovation and engagement are required to deliver further casualty reductions. New technologies, communications and information-gathering methods are offering opportunities to make further safety advances – but are also introducing new elements of risk. This is an exciting stage in the development of road safety (see Bliss, 2014).
Report aims

The aim of this report is to provide an overview of progress in road safety between 2010 and early 2015. Its purpose is to provide an evidence base for the new road safety strategy that the 2015 incoming UK Conservative Government will need to draw up. The report does not prescribe policies for the future – rather, it is intended to assist in the process of devising effective policies, structures and interventions. The Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (an All-Party Group), PACTS, has published its recommendations for future actions elsewhere (PACTS, 2014).

The report assesses, at a high level, the progress of road safety since 2010 against five criteria:

- Leadership and strategy
- Actions to improve road safety
- Resources and capacity
- Casualty and safety indicators
- Research, data and analysis.

Progress in road safety is the result of actions by many agencies, businesses and individuals, in the public, private and ‘third’ sectors (not for profit, etc.). This report acknowledges these important contributions and tries to take account of them, although its focus is on the role of government. Similarly, it is recognised that road safety is an increasingly devolved matter and that the governments and administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London play important roles – and, have to varying degrees, significant powers – in regard to road safety (Transport Safety Commission, 2015). The report attempts to summarise key developments in these jurisdictions, particularly where these differ from the situation in England and the UK Government. These are presented in Appendix A.
1.2 Research methodology

This report has combined desk-based analysis and new qualitative and quantitative research. PACTS has sought to include a wide range of stakeholders and perspectives. The main research stages were:

- Desk-based analysis of key policy documents, reported road casualty statistics and other official road safety data.
- Three workshops (‘expert seminars’), which comprised academics, road safety practitioners, road user representatives and others. These provided in-depth, qualitative assessment of the period from a range of stakeholders – public and private sector, academics, road user groups and others – and helped to shape the questionnaire. They also provided perspectives on the contributions to road safety from the private and third sectors.
- An online questionnaire survey sent to all local transport authorities in England outside London, seeking their assessments of road safety in their authority area and nationally since 2010 (see Appendix B). A response was received from 34 councils, covering more than a quarter of local authorities.
- Specific requests for information to the national road safety authorities in the four UK jurisdictions and London (see Appendix A).
- Learning from the PACTS road safety strategy conferences in March 2014 and 2015.

1.3 Previous research

This report concludes the PACTS and RAC Foundation Tackling the Deficit series, which has traced the development of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s road safety policies. The first report, published in October 2010 (Besley, 2010) highlighted the large number of organisations involved in UK road safety, suggested that this was an example of the ‘Big Society’ in action, and urged the new government to develop a “strategic backbone” to enable all stakeholders to contribute effectively. The second report, dated March 2011 (Baster, 2011) was published as the government was considering its Strategic Framework for Road Safety. It set out the case for a stronger focus on casualty reduction, and a vision for road safety supported by measurable outcomes and performance indicators. The third report, published in May 2012 (PACTS, 2012) presented the results of a questionnaire sent to members of the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning & Transport (ADEPT) and the Local Government Technical Advisers Group (TAG) in England regarding the situation for road safety in local government.
2. Leadership and Strategy

“There will always be an important role for central Government to play in road safety.”
Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Transport, May 2011 (DfT, 2011a: 5)
This section addresses the previous government’s approach towards leadership and strategy during its administration. It also assesses how the road safety strategy, set out in its Strategic Framework for Road Safety (DfT, 2011a), has been influenced by other political policies, notably austerity and localism, and whether or not this has allowed road safety professionals to maintain their focus in order to “ensure that Britain remains a world leader on road safety” as the Framework set out (DfT, 2011a: 11, para 15). The increasingly important leadership and strategy roles of the devolved administrations and other stakeholders are also summarised.

2.1 Road safety leadership

Throughout the Tackling the Deficit report series, PACTS has highlighted the importance of central government’s position and the possibilities of a unified direction under steady leadership from Westminster (Baster, 2011). The “privileged panorama view” of central government – and its capacity to encapsulate a range of individuals, groups and organisations under its aegis – has led many road safety stakeholders to urge that on matters of policy its “role should be to lead” (Baster, 2011).

Central government’s leadership in road safety over the past five years was criticised as being insufficient by the overwhelming majority of stakeholders in this research. They recognised the economic constraints but – from their perspective – the situation remained unsatisfactory. “We’ve had glorious statements but… no sustainability and follow-through”.1 In the survey of English local authorities (Q2, Appendix B), 76% thought the changes in general leadership and strategy were negative or strongly negative. The nature of the concern is explored below.

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1 Road Safety Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
“Government policies on road safety have been diluted. It is felt there is more emphasis on economic growth than casualty reduction. Government’s commitment to road safety is patchy and often consists of words and not deeds, e.g. no Green Paper on young drivers, ambivalence about the value of safety cameras and other technology, cuts in road traffic policing, removal of [the] Road Safety Grant making it more difficult for Councils to compete with other budget pressures.” (Local authority response, Q2 (a), Appendix B)

Government leadership has been identified by road safety stakeholders as “poor with very mixed messages [reflecting] an individual message from individual ministers”, with policy development often fluctuating, as opposed to being led by long-term policy goals. The turnover of road safety ministers – three during the administration – was seen to have caused inconsistency, particularly with regard to young driver safety and motorway speed limits.

2.2 **Road safety strategy**

The *Strategic Framework for Road Safety* shows how the Government perceived its role in road safety delivery after one year in office.

The need to “restore the public finances and return the economy to sustainable and secure economic growth” has been the major policy focus for the Government (DfT, 2011a: 7, para 7). The opening sections of the Framework make clear that the road safety strategy would have to fit into this constraint. It also highlighted the £16 billion cost of road collisions – a figure that does not include insurance or the additional costs of traffic delay (DfT, 2011a: 6, para 1).

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2 Driving Instructor Rep, Stakeholder workshop
Localism is also a clear principle: “wherever possible, local authorities should have the freedom to make their own decisions on road safety so they develop solutions that best suit their communities” (DfT, 2011a: 5). It maintained that there would be a fair split between “measures [the Government] intend to take nationally” and “areas where the policy and delivery will reflect local priorities, circumstances and economic assessment” (DfT, 2011a: 6, para 4).

The Framework focuses on education and enforcement approaches to road safety, seeking to target dangerous driving and to “mak[e] it easier for road users to do the right thing” (DfT, 2011a: 7, para 8).

Despite the attention paid to enforcement in the Framework, this has not been followed through in other key policies. The Strategic Policing Requirement issued by the Home Office (Home Office, 2015), listing the national threats that police chiefs must address, does not include road safety. Furthermore “less than a handful of Police [and] Crime Commissioners have actually got road safety as a key component of their delivery plan”.³ This lack of support from the Home Office, coupled with the low priority given to the issue by most local police, means that the ability to enforce road safety measures is limited by both resources and prioritisation. Some stakeholders argued that the Home Office and the police should be given a formal duty to enforce law on the roads in conjunction with DfT (the Department for Transport).⁴

The Framework does not address road safety engineering – this is seen as a matter for the Highways Agency (now Highways England) and local authorities. As a result of the Government’s reassessment of priorities away from local infrastructure projects, local authorities have instead focused on short-term approaches which require fewer resources and less input.

The Framework was accompanied by an action plan and a set of outcome indicators. These are considered in Sections 3 and 4 of this report.

Stakeholders and the local authorities surveyed were concerned about the approach set out in the Framework. The predominantly economic focus – at the expense of other policy concerns – has encouraged a “shift in the culture at the DfT”, encouraging policies which are often “judged entirely on getting value for money”, with savings dominating quality.⁵ Whilst economic growth and spending constraints are clearly overriding considerations for the Government, framing road safety strategy in these terms is not necessarily in the best interests of a coherent road safety strategy.

An overall fear was that the results of this shift in priorities will “only become apparent as time goes on” owing to the long-term nature of road safety investment “which means that the cuts don’t show short-term”.⁶

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³ National Roads Policing Rep, Stakeholder workshop  
⁴ Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop  
⁵ Road Safety Researcher, Stakeholder workshop  
⁶ Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
Many road safety stakeholders felt that the Government had “not set the bar very high” with the Framework. Most wanted a “comprehensive motoring [or transport] strategy that will actually look at the evidence” in the pursuit of road safety goals.

2.3 Localism

The Government’s policy of localism towards local government – to step away from centrally directed policy – has been applied to road safety for local authorities in England. This move was initially identified by stakeholders as “an act of leadership… saying that we’re going to change the nature of government”. There were some promising signs that decentralisation would bridge the gap between national and local government and encourage cooperation (Besley, 2010). This push towards localism with its aim of ensuring “that local authorities are clear that they can make full use of existing powers and flexibilities” had potential strengths, increasing the ability of local authorities to address their individual needs (DfT, 2011a: 8).

However, the outcomes have been variable, and road safety stakeholders have argued that the Government’s desire to remove the perception of a “central diktat” (DfT, 2011a: 8, para 9) has instead led to “patchy” implementation of policy. The reality is that successful road safety initiatives “may get picked up in some regions and not others and… that’s a big problem” in terms of consistency and in developing an overarching road safety agenda which puts those at risk first. In the survey of local authorities, 65% had adopted some form of road safety target. These varied in scope and baselines (see Appendix B, Q7).

Ultimately there has been a “lack of leadership from central government to local government, particularly in terms of guidance” and without this guidance communities have had difficulty in understanding that resources do not match local needs or local authority powers. Stakeholders wanted to see “a good coordinated approach” overseen by Westminster to ensure a clear message and unified action.

With the introduction of localism policies, it was clear that some improvements in road safety, including establishing the local evidence base for what works, would require more resources than could be funded locally. There was discussion amongst stakeholders about local authorities collaborating to fund these activities, but there is little evidence that this has happened. The Road

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7 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
8 Vehicle Leasing Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
9 Local Government Officer (Road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
10 Driving Instructor Rep, Stakeholder workshop
11 Local Government Officer (cycling & walking), Stakeholder workshop
12 Disabled Road User Rep, Stakeholder workshop
13 Freight Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
Safety Observatory (see Section 3) was an initiative from central government and other stakeholders which has attempted to bridge the knowledge gap.

2.4 Road safety targets

The Framework rejected the idea of national road safety targets. It opposed “resorting to more bureaucracy, targets and regulation”, framing them as a limiter of local ambition (DfT, 2011a: 5). The Framework did, however, include casualty forecasts for the number of people killed or seriously injured (KSI) in road accidents in Great Britain for the period 2010 to 2030. The central projection forecast is 1,770 deaths and 18,070 KSIs in 2020 (reductions of 37% and 40% respectively on the 2005-9 average). A low projection was also provided on the basis that new measures introduced would provide further casualty reduction benefits. This forecast 1,530 deaths and 15,110 KSIs in 2020.

The House of Commons Transport Select Committee has reviewed the Government’s road safety strategy twice since 2010. In its 2012 report the Committee confirmed that “Road safety targets have played an important role in driving the UK’s positive road safety record” (Transport Select Committee, 2012: 31). Although the Committee accepted the view of road safety minister, Mike Penning, that casualty reductions were possible without targets, it indicated that clear political leadership was still vital. In its subsequent inquiry document, Motoring of the Future, the Committee recommended that DfT should adopt a strategy that included the objective of “reduced or eliminated fatalities and serious injuries on roads” and “consider what impact setting targets to reduce serious injuries and fatalities might have on road safety in the UK” (Transport Select Committee, 2015: 9-13).

Stakeholders have argued that road safety has lost its profile nationally and locally, and “the reason that the priority is gone is that the targets have gone” as the targets “put the spotlight” on the road safety situation across the UK, and both provided a goal to aim for and a means by which local authorities could check their progress. Without that target the impetus has been lost – without it, progress is “not going to get measured and it’s not going to get done”. The loss of targets has had a significant impact on the impetus for road safety activity in some councils and the ability of local practitioners to negotiate with “those who don’t understand, don’t value or don’t see the role for road safety in the local priority list”.

14 Local Government Road Safety officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
15 Fire and Rescue Service Rep, Stakeholder workshop
16 Local Government Officer (Road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
The loss of casualty reduction targets under the Coalition Government was described by one local authority representative as “the single biggest cause of the dismantling of road safety’s operational capacity at a local and highway level”. In terms of child safety in particular, the loss of targets has been a blow as there were once road safety targets specifically geared towards children and to go “from that… to virtually nothing [is]… a retrograde step”.

2.5 Joined-up working

The Framework highlights that “making the links with other local agendas, such as public health and sustainable travel” can help remove the barriers to road safety (DfT, 2011a: 9). It noted that the annual cost to the NHS as a result of inactivity is somewhere between £1 billion and £1.8 billion and by encouraging a safer environment for walking and cycling there can be benefits for public health (DfT, 2011a: 37, para 3.27).

With reduced local funding, there are clearly attractions in encouraging road safety stakeholders to exploit common ground with sustainable transport, highways maintenance and public health outcomes. The experience thus far has received both positive feedback and negative criticism. The potential of public health to be a “liberator” for road safety policies has been argued, with public health officials providing the impetus and resources for schemes, including the 20 mph zones. The proportion of local authorities that thought that the stronger links between road safety, sustainable transport and public health had been positive for road safety amounted to 44%. However, some risks were also recognised. Effective joined-up working is dependent upon cooperation between departments on matters of funding, and on local circumstances. “It depends on what their local data reports are showing, what their priorities are, and their outcome needs” – and if these do not align then joined-up working will not occur.

“There are still no links with road safety and public health practitioners.” (Local authority survey, Q4, Appendix B)

2.6 Devolved administrations

The Framework “covers the whole of Great Britain” but notes the different approaches to road safety in Scotland, Wales and England, and the devolution of powers to Scotland. It does not cover Northern Ireland, where road safety powers have been devolved for many years.
The strategies, actions, resources and casualty trends in the devolved UK’s administrations (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London) are summarised in Appendix B. Whereas this report includes the views of local authorities in England outside London, it was beyond the scope of this study to adequately survey the views of third parties in other parts of the UK.

Each devolved administration has taken its own approach to road safety leadership and strategy; however, there are similarities between the strategy documents which noticeably veer away from DfT’s approach towards road safety. The most notable of these trends is the emphasis on stronger leadership from the centre, or in the case of Wales the desire to obtain the independence necessary to achieve this. Within Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London there is a distinct impression of the central administration exerting influence onto the exterior in the pursuit of positive road safety goals. The devolved administrations also published detailed action plans. London, for example, published separate road safety action plans for pedestrians, motorcyclists and cyclists. The setting of targets is another common feature, as unlike DfT – which has chosen to avoid the use of targets – each of the devolved administrations has highlighted, within their key strategy documents, casualty reduction targets which focus on lowering the numbers killed and seriously injured on the roads. Finally, the devolved administrations appear to have placed a greater emphasis on research than DfT has been able to of late, creating connections with research organisations in the pursuit of evidence-based policy and research-led consultations in order to influence the progress of road safety.

The trends in casualties are analysed by devolved administration in Section 5. Further details are provided in Appendix A and C (Table C.1). They show significant differences in progress when compared with casualty reduction across the UK.
2.7 Highways England

The strategic road network (the motorways and trunk roads) in England are constructed and managed by the Highways Agency, now Highways England. Government policy towards the strategic road network and the Highways Agency has changed significantly in the period 2010-15, with major implications for road safety.

Initially, there were substantial cuts to the Highways Agency’s budgets and it withdrew from much of its broader road safety activity, including its involvement in local road safety partnerships. By 2015 much had changed. The Infrastructure Act 2015 converted the Highways Agency to a government-owned company, renamed Highways England. Whilst the new company was given greater operational independence, the Government also set it various performance targets, including to reduce KSI casualties on the strategic road network by 40% by the end of 2020 against the 2005-9 baseline. In addition, the renamed Office of Rail and Road (formerly the Office of Rail Regulation) was given the duty of monitoring the performance and efficiency of Highways England, including its road safety performance. The Government also produced a Road Investment Strategy, with a greatly expanded programme of investment and a five-year budget to match (DfT, 2015a). This included £105 million of capital funding for additional road safety measures.

Highways England has published a Strategic Business Plan 2015-2020 which goes beyond the Government’s safety target: “We believe ‘no one should be harmed when travelling or working on the Strategic Road Network’. To achieve this ambitious goal, we will implement a comprehensive Safe Systems approach and strategy focused on safer vehicles, safer roads for safer people” (Highways England, 2014: 13).

In stark contrast to the situation for local highway authorities and local roads in England, an ambitious and well-funded path has been set out for the strategic road network.

2.8 New leaders in road safety

A number of the stakeholders who participated in the workshops were positive about the fact that road safety leadership, activity and research was increasingly being undertaken by their own organisations – either independently, or with encouragement of central government. These included a range of public, private and third-sector bodies, covering functions as diverse as vehicle safety technology, fleet management, emergency services, road safety education, telematics, the motoring insurance industry, driver training, data analysis and policy research.

They saw this not as a substitute for leadership by central government, but as a valuable adjunct to it.
3. Actions to Improve Road Safety

“The UK currently has amongst the safest roads in the world... However this is not a reason for complacency; it is a sign of what can be achieved with the right policies, actions and behaviours.”
(DfT, 2011a: 6, para 3)
This section lists the principal road safety actions proposed by the UK Government in its *Road Safety Action Plan* (Annex A to the *Framework*; DfT, 2011a) and two that have been subsequently added. It summarises whether or not they were implemented.

The views of some local authorities and stakeholders regarding these actions are given here and in Appendix B. A proper evaluation of the effectiveness of the actions would require a much larger study over a longer period.

### 3.1 Progress with DfT’s Action Plan

The *Framework* focused on education and enforcement and the Action Plan reflects this. Of the 16 measures, 9 are categorised as enforcement, 5 as education and 2 as information.

Table 3.1 shows that DfT and its partners have implemented the majority of the planned actions: 11 can be deemed completed and 2 discontinued, while 2 are ongoing and 1 has been abandoned.

DfT published a *Final Progress Update* in September 2013 (DfT, 2013a).

Progress has been made with enforcement actions: new offences have been created (drug-driving, causing serious injury by dangerous driving); existing laws have been modified to facilitate easier enforcement (drink-driving and careless driving); Fixed Penalty Notice penalties have been raised (from £60 to £100) for existing offences; and drug screening equipment to assist police enforcement has been approved. The introduction of the new laws on drug-driving and the screening equipment was complex and represent a major effort by the Government.\(^{21}\) It is unclear to what extent progress has been made with encouraging greater use of the ‘forfeiture of vehicles’ powers by courts.

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\(^{21}\) Dr Robert Tunbridge, PACTS conference, London, 18 March 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduce a fixed penalty notice for careless driving (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Came into force in August 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise fines for road traffic fixed penalty notices (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Penalties raised to £100 in August 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw ‘statutory option’ for drink-drivers (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Came into force in April 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a new drug-driving offence (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Came into force in March 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage greater use of the forfeiture of vehicles powers by courts</td>
<td>DfT continuing to explore how to best encourage the use of these powers</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce portable evidential breath testing equipment (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Home Office type approval testing underway</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduce drug screening devices (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Home Office completed type approval for a station-based drug screener and two portable screeners by March 2015</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Include safety messages in driving theory tests (Education)</td>
<td>Trial did not achieve intended result and was discontinued</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide increased educational offerings to offenders in place of fixed penalty notices (Education)</td>
<td>Courses for seatbelt wearing and careless driving developed</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a course in place of losing one’s driving licence (Education)</td>
<td>Not progressed on account of expansion of National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme</td>
<td>Discontinued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a course and assessment for offenders to regain their licence after a serious disqualification (Education)</td>
<td>Research about effectiveness of and alternatives to extended driving tests for disqualified motoring offenders underway (March 2015)</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a new post-test qualification to replace Pass Plus and improve the skills of inexperienced drivers (Education)</td>
<td>Exploratory work undertaken with the Driving Standards Agency and insurance industry but young driver safety Green Paper not published</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a website for comparison of local road safety performance information (Information)</td>
<td>Website launched March 2013 but closed March 2015 (see <a href="http://road-collisions.dft.gov.uk">http://road-collisions.dft.gov.uk</a>)</td>
<td>Yes (but closed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a portal for road safety professionals to road safety research (Information)</td>
<td>Road Safety Observatory website launched March 2013 and extended in subsequent years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow local authorities greater flexibility in setting local speed limits* (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Revised Speed Limit Circular and Speed Limit Appraisal Tool published January 2013</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create a new offence of causing serious injury by dangerous driving* (Enforcement)</td>
<td>Introduced in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and commenced May 2012</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Road Safety Action Plan (DfT, 2011a: Annex A); and PACTS

Note: *New measure added – not in 2011 Action Plan
In line with the Government’s encouragement of local solutions, DfT enabled local authorities to have greater flexibility in setting local speed limits. A revised Speed Limit Circular was developed and this and a Speed Limit Appraisal Tool were launched in January 2013 in order to enable local setting of speed limits in England. This has resulted in a considerable expansion of 20 mph speed limits. DfT has commissioned research into the safety implications and suitable success criteria.

The type approval of portable evidential breath testing equipment, designed to improve the efficiency of drink-drive enforcement, has slipped. The 2013 DfT update stated that “Trials have now been scheduled by the Home Office to start in 2013 and complete in 2014” (DfT, 2013a). However, type approval of the first devices is now not anticipated until late 2016. It appears to have been accorded a lower priority by the Home Office than type approval of drug screening devices, although legislation for their use was enacted as long ago as 2005.

Progress with the education actions has been mixed. Some new courses have been developed but specific actions to address safety for young drivers have been modified or abandoned. Placing safety messages at the end of the theory test was piloted but the results were disappointing. The major action – publication of a Green Paper on young driver safety – was abandoned. The Government decided that graduated driver licensing was too controversial, and instead commissioned research into telematics-based insurance policies.

The two information actions – both websites – were implemented. The English Road Safety Comparison Website – to facilitate citizen ‘armchair auditors’ – was launched in March 2013 as planned, but was withdrawn after two years as the information was either available elsewhere or was unreliable. The Road Safety Observatory – an initiative delivered by DfT in partnership with a number of other road safety stakeholders, including RoSPA (the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents), PACTS and the RAC Foundation – took longer to develop but is now well established. It is likely to continue and expand with support from Highways England.

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22 The Final Progress Update stated that a Green Paper on young driver safety would be published by end of December 2013.
24 The Road Safety Observatory website, www.roadsaftyobservatory.com
3.2 Other developments

Measures outside the Road Safety Action Plan were identified during the stakeholder workshops. These actions identified included:

- **Speed limit reductions**: There has been a large surge of interest in the use of 20 mph limits in local authorities. In particular public health bodies, including NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence), PHE (Public Health England) and those in local authorities, have expressed interest in working with road safety professionals as they “see big gains” in terms of road casualties. However this approach has been strongly localised as “what makes sense in a built up area in a large town doesn’t necessarily make sense in a rural area”. There was also criticism of the Speed Limit Appraisal Tool by some local authority respondents.

- **Expansion of the Fleet Operator Recognition Scheme**: The expansion of the scheme from its previous focus on the big logistics companies to bus and coach operators and smaller businesses has made steps to “change... [the] culture”.

- **Cycling**: This has risen up the agenda, particularly in the wake of Olympic success, with improved cycling infrastructure development, e.g. London Cycle Superhighways and continued funding for the Bikeability scheme. Indeed, cycling has kept road safety in the public and political eye. “The emphasis on at least some aspects of sustainable travel, cycling in particular, has been really positive. And I think they’ve grasped that relationship between cycling in particular and safety and what it takes to increase public confidence.”

- **Telematics**: There has been a significant increase in the use of telematics to improve driving behaviour, largely amongst novice drivers. A telematics-based insurance product that successfully reduces the risk factors described above is expected to have a positive impact on safety, assuming that there are no unintended consequences which increase risk and offset any safety gains. Insurance stakeholders have argued that “in terms of safety in our field [insurance], what’s happened in terms of telematics and road safety data is huge, and we’ve got the data to prove our drivers are 30% safer after a year than if they didn’t have telematics data.” Ongoing research comparing the behavioural responses of a range of population groups to different types of vehicle telematics aims to determine conclusively the extent to which these systems can affect driving behaviours.

- **Driving test**: The Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency has carried out a range of activities which seek to improve the way that learners learn to drive, and to align the driving test with the skills and attitudes required

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25 Local Government Officer (Road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
26 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
27 Local Government Road Safety Policy Rep, Stakeholder workshop
28 Local Government Officer (Road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
29 Insurance Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
by new drivers. There are concerns that ongoing restructuring since the Driving Standards Agency (DSA) and the Vehicle Operating Standards Agency merged, with targeted savings of £8.1 million at the former DSA, may derail future work in this key area. “Independent driving… is a good thing and has made a difference to the way we run the test… moving the test closer to real-world driving”.

- **The Health and Well-Being Boards:** These are “paying attention to children’s road safety [and]… there’s a lot of attention on children’s safety, on children’s well-being and reducing the inequalities in health for children – and that’s a really big thing”.

### 3.3 Missed opportunities

However, in spite of these successes there has undoubtedly been disappointment amongst road safety practitioners over the Government’s lack of action on – or outright rejection of – some road safety schemes during this period. The stakeholder workshops held by PACTS identified key issues in this area, which included:

- **Graduated driver licensing:** The lack of a Green Paper discussing the costs and benefits during this administration has been a “missed opportunity” for road safety practitioners, even those not necessarily supportive of the scheme. The Green Paper would have provided an opportunity to continue the debate on young driver training and the potential approach needed to support new and inexperienced drivers. Instead, the debate appears to have almost faded from view – or at least from the public eye. “What we’ve done is just stopped, and I think that is utterly irresponsible and shows a lack of leadership. Instead of facing the actual difficulty and saying how does this work? What’s different and how does it need to be altered to make it effective?”

- **Safe System approach:** “If you’re trying to change things… it’s much easier to change the thing you control, which [for highways authorities] is the network… that’s where the Safe Systems approach comes from, the thing we have in common.”

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30 Driving Instructor Rep, Stakeholder workshop  
31 Child Safety Rep / Stakeholder workshop  
32 Insurance Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop  
33 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop  
34 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
• **Hybrid vehicles**: Opportunities to integrate safety with environment-friendly vehicle initiatives have not been fully exploited. The Government is investing £900 million between 2010 and 2020 into developing electric and low-emission vehicles within the UK, but enhanced safety standards (such as mandating the purchase of vehicles with a five-star Euro NCAP rating) have not been applied. Additionally, these vehicles “don’t make as much sound as conventional vehicles [and] it’s very dangerous for blind or partially sighted people as well as other pedestrians”, and that won’t change until legislation comes into force in 2021.35

• **Vehicle technology**: “We’ve got technologies here and now that could have a demonstrable impact on road safety and it’s whether these are being exploited enough”.36 Furthermore, in terms of legislation DfT is “beginning to say this is a European issue and we’re not getting involved”.37 And as a result road safety legislation runs the risk of being overtaken by vehicle technology.

• **Driver distraction**: Some concern emerged that research and legislation is not keeping pace with new potential sources of distraction. “There are some worrying distractions coming into cars… which the Government aren’t reacting to.”38 There is ongoing European research, which has its focus on distraction-related issues around technological developments in nomadic devices (such as tablets, smartphones, and wearable technology), and in-car technology (such as driver aids and manufacturer ‘infotainment’ systems).39

• **Older drivers**: Described by one stakeholder as an “issue that’s completely fallen off the Minister’s desk” – and as the UK faces reducing public transport services and an increasing ageing population it is becoming more and more important.40 However, local schemes including the Older Drivers Forum for Hampshire are “getting very successful” nationally.41 The report *Making Road Safety Pay* (Road Safety Foundation, 2014) recommended that Britain should develop a National Older Driver Strategy with a task force to review evidence and make recommendations. This is now underway and is being coordinated by the Road Safety Foundation, with financial support from Ageas.

• **Education**: Stakeholders argued that road safety “should be built into the [school] curriculum at every Key Stage” instead of the “ad hoc” approach to how children learn and the extent to which they learn.42 Whilst the Government has focused on the re-education of drivers, “road safety education for children has not moved on for the past five years… there’s no innovation”.43

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35 Disabled Road User Rep, Stakeholder workshop
36 Vehicle Leasing Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
37 Local Government Road Safety Policy Rep, Stakeholder workshop
38 Insurance Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
40 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
41 Roads Policing Officer, Stakeholder workshop
42 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
43 Motoring Research Manager, Stakeholder workshop
• **Drink-Driving:** Stakeholders highlighted that the UK Government, unlike the Scottish Government, has missed an opportunity to introduce a lower breath test limit, as recommended by the North Report (North, 2010).44

• **Vulnerable user groups:** There is a need for “proper interaction with the relevant departments who deal with vulnerable road users” for traditionally peripheral user groups such as equestrians.45

It is unclear why the *Final Progress Update* was published in 2013, as DfT continued to push through legislation on drink- and drug-driving, to commission large research projects and to engage in other road safety matters until the final day of the Coalition Government.

44 Road Safety Manager, Stakeholder workshop
45 Equestrian Safety Rep, Stakeholder workshop
4. Resources and Capacity

“The challenge is for all of us to continue to deliver crucial services and safety outcomes as resources become tighter.” (DfT, 2011a: 15, para 1.12)
4.1 Budgets

The Coalition Government placed budget deficit reduction at the forefront of the political agenda – a prioritisation which has been extremely influential on all other policy aims and objectives, and which involved budget cuts, declining resource availability and, inevitably, reducing operational capacity.

The 2010 Emergency Budget set the tone for the previous government’s approach to DfT funding. The Budget resulted in a 27% cut in the Road Safety Revenue Grant (reducing it from £77.3 million to £56.7 million) and the immediate abolition of the £17.2 million Road Safety Capital Grant (Besley, 2010: 13).

These reductions lay alongside predictions of future reductions in the Departmental Expenditure Limit in terms of capital and resources available to DfT.

Additional information on the road safety budgets of devolved administrations is provided in Appendix A.

4.2 DfT road safety budget

Table 4.1 shows how the funding of road safety by DfT has fallen substantially since the start of 2010. There have been substantial cuts in the three main road safety funds since 2009/10. By contrast, funding for cyclist training (Bikeability) increased and a new (non-recurring) Cycle Safety Fund was introduced.

The view of stakeholders was that cuts in public sector funding have had a significant impact on DfT’s ability to provide evidence-based road safety projects, as often they “don’t have the money, the options or the research” necessary for innovation.46

46 Road Safety Researcher, Stakeholder workshop
Whilst the Government is “talking about the economy recovering, the pressure on the public sector is increasing” and the shift to “smaller and smaller government” has influenced spending on road safety.47

**Table 4.1: DfT funding for road safety measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009/10</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
<th>2013/14</th>
<th>2014/15*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road safety grants</td>
<td>£1.5m</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
<td>£0.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road safety research</td>
<td>£3.4m</td>
<td>£1.15m</td>
<td>£0.46m**</td>
<td>£1.73m</td>
<td>£1.77m</td>
<td>£1.80m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THINK! campaigns</td>
<td>£18.6m</td>
<td>£2.3m</td>
<td>£4m</td>
<td>£3.6m</td>
<td>£3.3m</td>
<td>£5.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bikeability</td>
<td>£5.4m</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>£11m</td>
<td>£11m</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cycle safety fund</td>
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<td>£15m</td>
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<td>(London)</td>
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<td>£15m</td>
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<td>(rest of England)</td>
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<td>£5m</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(rest of England)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT, Submission to the Transport Safety Commission, January 2015
Notes: These figures exclude local authority Road Safety Capital Grants and Road Safety Revenue Grants – see Section 4.1.
* Figures for 2014/15 are budgets rather than final spends.
** The funding for 2011/12 appears lower than that for other years, largely because some planned research was delayed until 2012, pushing the costs into that year instead.

47 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
4.3 Local authorities’ road safety spending

According to the English Road Safety Comparison Website, an official website established by DfT, total capital spending on road safety across England in 2010 was £177 million, and by 2012 this had dropped to £2 million (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Total local authority capital spending on road safety across England (2005 to 2012)

There are questions about the reliability of the financial data on this website. The capital expenditure for 2012/13 matches quite well with the figures on the local authority capital expenditure site. However, the revenue spend data does not seem to match readily with that found on the local authority revenue expenditure site and therefore has not been reported here.

The funding that road safety has received for cycling measures has also been criticised for its “stop-start nature” and the lack of consistent long-term financial support which would enable better planning of schemes. There was concern that this on-off approach to funding – sometimes due to ministerial changes within DfT – means that the money that is available for cycling often “gets spent badly”.

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50 Cyclist Rep, Stakeholder workshop
51 Cyclist Rep, Stakeholder workshop
“I think there’s no doubt about it: the lack of targets, the loss of resource, the reduction in Road Safety Officers, the sacking of school-crossing patrols, you name it. We could be here for the rest of the day on the reduction of road safety activities.”

4.4 Human resources

Many areas of DfT are seeing “experienced people... disappear” because of budget cuts, and as a result there has been “a haemorrhaging of skills” from the Department. Now, instead of individuals within DfT focusing on different aspects of road safety, “people are becoming jacks-of-all-trades” in order to cope with the loss of staff and the need for productivity. This approach towards road safety, together with a significant reduction in manpower, means that there is now a “real need to up skills at the DfT”, as despite Department attempts to bring in new people, they often lack the experience of their predecessors.

A further concern was the impact on road safety expertise of considerable churn in personnel. “In terms of their own people in roles at DfT, local authorities and local Road Safety Officers... the body of experts around the country who do the research and analysis... a lot has happened in the last five years.”

As a result of the shift towards economic priorities and spending constraints, stakeholders have argued that there has been “an eradication of road safety capacity coming from both levels: the local funding level and from national policy”. With the major impetus behind Government policy focused on “economic recovery and job creation” which can be seen within the Local Enterprise Partnerships, there is a “limit to the latitude which is allowed” in terms of policy for road safety.

4.5 Roads policing

There has been a 23% reduction in the number of full-time equivalent traffic police officers from 5,635 in 2010 to 4,356 in 2014 (Figure 4.2). Reductions have been experienced in 41 of the 43 forces (Suffolk and Warwickshire reported increases in traffic police numbers), ranging from a 1% reduction in Cheshire to a 76% reduction in Devon and Cornwall.

52 Older Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
53 Road Safety Manager, Stakeholder workshop
54 Road Safety Researcher, Stakeholder workshop
55 Road Safety Researcher, Stakeholder workshop
56 Local Government Officer (road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
57 Suffolk roads policing number now included armed response officers – AIRSO (Association of Industrial Road Safety Officers) Newsletter March 2015.
58 House of Commons Hansard, Answer to PQ from Jack Dromey MP, 2 February 2015.
As a result of these cuts, those officers that remain no longer “have the time to be as proactive” as they were during previous administrations and are having to “prioritise what is achievable” in road safety gains. On account of “limited resources and the cutbacks that everybody is seeing across the country” it has become necessary for the police to be “very clear about setting ourselves… long-term [road safety] goals” with little room for leeway in the current climate, and often it is the tried and tested idea that receive the greatest support.

Whilst some stakeholders considered that the police had “managed to really grab hold of their funding” through NDORS (the National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme), they have nevertheless been affected by the budget cuts. The local road safety partnerships, which support police safety camera programmes and other enforcement activity, have recovered considerably from the difficulties they faced in 2010.

An older-driver representative noted that there were fewer traffic police on the strategic road network and that this “huge reduction in visible enforcement is a concern” for many drivers, especially “for older drivers”.

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59 Roads Policing Officer, Stakeholder workshop
60 Roads Policing Officer, Stakeholder workshop
61 Road Safety Manager, Stakeholder workshop
62 Older Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
Stakeholders were concerned about the reduction in the nation’s road safety capability, predicting that the “damage will be much greater” in the long run as “corporate memories and experiences will be gone in many areas, or certainly be diminished”.

### 4.6 Local impacts

The National Audit Office report *Financial Sustainability of Local Authorities (2014)* has estimated that in real terms there was a 37% reduction in government funding to the local authorities between 2010/11 and 2015/16 (National Audit Office, 2014: 13, para 1.6). These cuts to local authority budgets have had a severe impact on the operational capacity of road safety across the country.

Government is “devolving power to local authorities… and then not laying out any… tools or resources” to support them in reducing road casualties. As one council officer put it, “Unfortunately [XXX] City Council has deleted the Road Safety function.”

The local road safety landscape has changed since the start of 2010, with many authorities “having to take a cutback” in their delivery of road safety, and as a result “there have been lots of redundancies”. With this loss of resources – both human and financial – alongside a strategy of localism, a situation has developed where “public expectation is high, but what is actually going to occur in terms of service delivery is low.” The reductions in funding and staff available to local authorities means that they have had to prioritise which services they deliver. Because road safety has “lost its profile at the national level”, this has had an impact on how it is regarded at the local level.

Whereas many residents are under the impression that if their local authority “has the power” to enact changes to road safety schemes “by implication therefore it can be done”, this is often not the case owing to the limitations of joined-up working and of availability of funding.

The loss of the Road Safety Grant has been significant – it was specific to road safety and “gave pioneering local authorities the opportunity to bid for attempts to implement pioneering solutions”. Now that it has gone, in many local authorities the capacity of road safety is often dependent upon accessing alternative funding streams through partnership and cooperation with other departments, e.g. the Local Sustainable Transport Fund and the Local

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63 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
64 Local Government Road Safety Policy Rep, Stakeholder workshop
65 Email to PACTS from an English Unitary Council, April 2014
66 Local Government Road Safety Officers Rep, Stakeholder workshop
67 Road Safety Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
68 Local Government Officer (Road casualty reduction), Stakeholder workshop
69 Road Safety Manager, Stakeholder workshop
Enterprise Partnerships. However, these often rely on policy aims matching up, which is not always the case.

Stakeholders considered that there have been some benefits to emerge from the reductions in funds available to road safety schemes, notably the removal of “dead wood out of the road safety business”. The cuts justified the removal of some highly visible but also bloated road safety initiatives, particularly in relation to young drivers, which were not evidence-based and lacked “proper evaluation”. Therefore, the budget cuts have, to some extent, provided a “clean sheet” in previously unwieldy areas of road safety.

Overall, whilst some promising funding developments are now becoming available to road safety stakeholders, there is a need to “make sure the resources are there” in order to halt the trend of “doing knee-jerk quick things” which has developed since 2010. The Government’s desire for “value for money” has hit DfT’s and local authorities’ road safety budgets hard in terms of funding and resources, and the legacy of that approach is likely to be seen in the years to come.

70 Young Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
71 Young Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
72 Young Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
73 Freight Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
74 Driving Instructor Rep, Stakeholder workshop
5. Road Casualties and Safety Indicators

This section summarises key recent casualty trend data; additional statistical details are provided in Appendix C. Also summarised here are some additional indicators identified by the Government in the Framework as relevant to monitoring road safety.
Progress in road safety is usually assessed in terms of reductions in reported road casualties (particularly KSI casualties), whether by the absolute number or by a rate (e.g. road deaths per million population). The key data source for Great Britain is *Reported Road Casualties Great Britain* (DfT, 2014a) in which DfT collates the STATS19 records from the police. In Northern Ireland these statistics are handled by the Police Service Northern Ireland. Whilst these two data sources have their limitations, they are each the best single source available.

Because the data sets are reported separately, some of the following analysis shows the combined UK data while other parts show Great Britain only.

For most comparison purposes, DfT’s (and TfL’s) baseline of average casualties 2005-9 has been used in this report. The Governments of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales set casualty reduction targets relative to the casualty average for 2004-8 when casualties were higher (KSI casualties in 2009 were lower than in 2004.) Progress towards these targets will therefore be greater than change relative to the 2005-9 average.

STATS19 reported casualty data to 2014 is used here wherever available. 2013 figures are used where detailed 2014 statistics have not yet been released. A full set of statistics are published in September each year in *Reported Road Casualties Great Britain*.

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75 STATS19 is the national database of police-reported injury road collisions in Great Britain.

76 Concerns were raised in stakeholder workshops that STATS19 reporting rates and accuracy were diminishing as a result of reductions in dedicated road policing officers.

77 The 2004-8 average was the baseline proposed for road safety targets for Great Britain to 2020 by the DfT in its consultation paper *A Safer Way*, April 2009 (DfT, 2009). The incoming Coalition Government took a different approach and later adopted 2005-09 as the baseline for evaluation.
5.1 Casualty trends

UK deaths and serious injuries

Overall, the long-term downward trend in KSI casualty reduction across the UK has continued after 2010\textsuperscript{78}, but at a slower rate than previously\textsuperscript{79} and at an uneven rate from year to year and across the UK – see Figure 5.1.

In 2010 there was a substantial reduction (9%) in KSIs compared with 2009. The reduction in fatalities was even greater (17%). Between 2011 and 2014 KSIs reduced more much slowly and the trend has not been uniformly downwards: in 2011 KSIs increased by 2% and in 2014 by 5%, compared to the previous year – see Appendix C (Figure C.3).

Relative to DfT’s 2005-9 baseline, there has been a 19% decline in KSIs in the UK to 2014. Most of the decline occurred between 2007 and 2010. This was particularly marked for deaths – see Appendix C (Table C.2). Since 2010 there has been only modest change. The downward trend in slight casualties has continued until 2014 when a 6% increase was recorded for the first time since 1997 – see Appendix C (Figure C.1).

There has been considerable variation in the rate of progress across the UK. The highest percentage reductions in KSI were in London (-40%), Northern Ireland (-34%) and Scotland (-31%), while England excluding London (-17%) and Wales (-6%) saw reductions below the UK average (-19%) – see Table 5.1.

The rankings for percentage reductions in deaths only were somewhat different, with a much narrower range: from -39% in London to -27% in Scotland – see Appendix C (Table C.1).

\textsuperscript{78} The KSI statistic is predominantly a measure of serious injuries, as there are approximately ten serious injuries for every death.

\textsuperscript{79} It is estimated that the economic downturn may have contributed to about two-thirds of the decrease in fatalities between 2008 and 2010 (IRTAD, 2015).
Figure 5.1: KSI casualties by jurisdiction (United Kingdom, 2005-14)

Table 5.1: KSI casualties by jurisdiction (United Kingdom, 2005-9 average and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
<th>KSI 2005-9 average</th>
<th>KSI 2014</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England excl. London</td>
<td>22,330</td>
<td>19,255</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>3,628</td>
<td>2,170</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total England</td>
<td>25,958</td>
<td>21,425</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>2,739</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Great Britain</td>
<td>30,041</td>
<td>24,582</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>-34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>31,241</td>
<td>25,371</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2015b); and PSNI (2015: 4)

5.1.1 Casualties by road user groups

By 2014 the number of deaths for all major road user groups had fallen significantly since the 2005-9 average. Much of this occurred in 2010 when there were significant reductions for all groups except pedal cyclists. Since
2010 the trend has been more mixed – generally downward for all groups but relatively small changes for some – see Appendix C (Table C.2).

Looking at KSI, the percentage reductions since the baseline period for vulnerable road users (pedestrians, pedal cyclists and motorcyclists) are much lower for serious injuries than for deaths. Indeed, the number of pedal cyclists reported seriously injured has increased by 42% (which may be partially attributed to a large increase in cycling) – see Appendix C (Tables C.3, C.4 and C.5).

Vulnerable road users now (in 2014) make up a larger share of total road deaths than in 2005-9 (50% compared with 46% – see Figures 5.2 and 5.3). During the period 2000-9, car occupants made up close to 50% of total road deaths each year. In 2010 this fell to 45% and remained at this lower level (45% in 2014). This was the result of bigger reductions in car occupant deaths than in other user groups. The fatality rate per billion miles travelled also decreased at a greater rate for car occupants than for vulnerable road users – see Appendix C (Figure C.2). It is not clear if this is a temporary change or an indication of a longer-term trend. It also raises questions as to the underlying causes. These might include the fall in vehicle occupant casualties due to the recession (with fewer miles driven, and at lower speeds), improvements in vehicle safety technologies and increases in cycle mileage.
Figure 5.2: Deaths by road user group (Great Britain, 2005-9 average)

- Pedal cyclists: 130 (5%)
- Car occupants: 1,407 (50%)
- Pedestrians: 613 (22%)
- Motorcyclists: 544 (19%)
- Other: 122 (4%)

Source: DfT (2014a: 156, Table RAS30060)

Figure 5.3: Deaths by road user group (Great Britain, 2014)

- Pedal cyclists: 113 (6%)
- Car occupants: 797 (45%)
- Pedestrians: 446 (25%)
- Motorcyclists: 339 (19%)
- Other: 80 (5%)

Source: DfT (2015b: 4, Chart 2)
5.1.2 Casualties by age group

Figure 5.4 shows the changes in KSI casualties by age group in 2014 compared to a 2005-9 baseline. The biggest reductions are seen among 16- to 24-year olds. This might reflect a reduction in the number of young people learning to drive. The proportion of those aged 17-20 in England holding a licence has declined by 13% between the 2005-9 average and 2013 (by 21% for males and by 3% for females; calculated from DfT, 2014b). The average distance travelled as a car/van driver by 17- to 20-year olds in Great Britain has declined by 15% between the 2005-9 average and 2012 (calculated from DfT, 2014c). It is also interesting to note the increase in casualty numbers in the older age groups.

Figure 5.4: Reductions in KSIs by age (Great Britain, 2014 compared to 2005-9 average)

5.1.3 National Travel Survey casualty estimates

The 2010 National Travel Survey (NTS) estimated the total number of road casualties in Great Britain (including those not reported to any relevant authority) to be within the range of 660-800 thousand, with a central estimate of 730 thousand based on survey data from 2004-2010 (DfT, 2011b). The NTS results for 2013 suggest there was little change in the number of unreported casualties since 2010, with the central estimate for casualties in 2013 of 720 thousand, a 1% reduction from the 2010 figure (DfT, 2014d).
5.1.4 International comparisons

International comparison shows that the UK maintained its position of having one of the lowest fatality rates (measured by road deaths per million population) of all OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries over the period 2010-13 – see Appendix C (Figure C.4). In 2011 the UK (and Great Britain) moved to the lowest (i.e. best) position (DfT, 2012a: 232, Table RAS52001); in 2013 Sweden again moved below the UK and Great Britain (DfT, 2014e). Both Sweden and the UK reduced their fatality rate from approximately 31 deaths per million to below 28 deaths per million in this period. In 2014, Malta and Sweden achieved lower fatality rates than the UK, at 24, 28 and 29 deaths per million respectively (ETSC, 2015). This statistic has enabled DfT ministers to say, repeatedly, that the UK “has amongst the safest roads in the world”. However, it is not clear from these overall fatality rates whether the UK has the safest roads, or whether it has the safest vehicles or the safest road users, or if some other factor is relevant.

5.2 Non-casualty indicators in Strategic Framework

“We are moving to a more sophisticated method of monitoring progress through a Road Safety Outcomes Framework. This should help local authorities to assess and prioritise their action and show the impact of central Government measures.” (DfT, 2011a: 8, para 10)

The Road Safety Outcomes Framework in DfT’s Strategic Framework for Road Safety contained 22 indicators which are reported annually in Reported Road Casualties Great Britain. The indicators are grouped into six ‘areas’:

- Casualties
- Learning to drive
- Remedial education
- Enforcement
- Vehicle safety
- Perceptions of road safety

The 22 include seven non-casualty indicators, in an attempt to assess intermediate safety factors and perceptions of safety, as well as road casualty trends. The trends in these seven indicators are summarised in Table 5.2; all statistics in the subsections that follow may be found in Reported Road Casualties Great Britain: 2013 (DfT, 2014a: 178-9, Table RAS41001).
Table 5.2: Non-casualty indicators in DfT’s Road Safety Outcomes Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator number</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Learning to drive</td>
<td>Number and proportion of new drivers that pass their driving test on the first attempt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Remedial education</td>
<td>Number of people taking courses as a form of remedial penalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4.2</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Proportion of drivers admitting to have driven while under the influence of an illegal drug at least once in 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Proportion of vehicles exceeding the speed limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Number of motoring offences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Perceptions of road safety</td>
<td>Whether people feel safe cycling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Perceptions of road safety</td>
<td>Whether people feel safe walking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2014a: 178-9, Table RAS41001)

5.2.1 Number and proportion of new drivers that pass their driving test on the first attempt (Indicator 2.3)

There have been fluctuations in the number of new drivers passing first time, but the proportion has increased from 44% in 2007 to 48% in 2013.

5.2.2 Number of people taking courses as a form of remedial penalty (Indicator 3.1)

This indicator monitors the number of driver offenders having to take one or more of the following courses as a form of remedial penalty: ‘Driver Alertness Course’, ‘Rider Intervention Developing Experience’, ‘National Speed Awareness Course’, ‘Driving 4 Change’, ‘What’s Driving Us?’ and ‘Your Belt, Your Life’. A complete series of figures is not available and lies outside the scope of National Statistics. There were 468,000 drivers taking these courses in 2010, a number which increased to 1,071,000 in 2013. It should be noted that the number of courses has increased in recent years and that the national referral scheme has expanded. Therefore the increases in attendance do not necessarily indicate increased levels of enforcement or referrals, but might be attributable to a wider availability and variety of courses.

5.2.3 Proportion of drivers admitting to have driven while under the influence of an illegal drug at least once in 12 months (Indicator 4.4.2)

Results from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, provided by Home Office, are used to determine the proportion of drivers who admitted to have
driven while under the influence of an illegal drug at least once in 12 months. In 2010 and 2011, the proportion was 1%, whilst it was 0.5% in 2012. Data for 2013 has not yet been presented (in Reported Road Casualties Great Britain).

5.2.4 Proportion of vehicles exceeding the speed limit (Indicator 4.6)

The proportion of vehicles exceeding the speed limit is calculated using traffic surveys and estimates from DfT. Comparing 2013 data with a 2005-9 average shows improved compliance with speed limits among all vehicle classes:

- **Cars**: The proportion of cars exceeding the 30 mph limit decreased from 49% to 46%, while those exceeding the 70 mph limit on motorways decreased from 53% to 47%.
- **Motorcycles**: The proportion of motorcycles exceeding the 30 mph limit decreased from 51% to 47%, while those exceeding the 70 mph limit on motorways decreased from 53% to 46%.
- **Articulated HGVs**: The proportion of articulated HGVs exceeding the 40 mph limit (on single carriageways) decreased from 76% to 73%, while those exceeding the 50 mph limit (on dual carriageways) decreased from 84% to 82%.
- **Rigid two-axle HGVs**: There was no change in the proportion of rigid two-axle HGVs exceeding the limit on 30 mph roads (46%), while the proportion exceeding 40mph limit decreased from 22% to 20%.

5.2.5 Number of motoring offences (Indicator 4.8)

The indicator for motoring offences includes the number of offences for dangerous, careless or drunken driving; accident and speed limit offences; unauthorised taking or theft of motor vehicle; licence and insurance offences; vehicle test and condition offences; and traffic and other offences. It does not include any parking, waiting or road obstruction offences. The number of offences reported is calculated as the sum of Fixed Penalty Notices and summons issued.

The number of motoring offences for this indicator has declined since a peak in 2006 (Figure 5.5). This is likely to be due to the introduction of diversion courses (NDORS) reported in Indicator 3.1 (section 5.2.2). It does not necessarily show a change in driver behaviour.

There could be several other reasons why the number of offences has decreased since this time: 2007 saw the introduction of a Road Safety Grant given directly to local authorities, ending the safety camera hypothecation system, which led to operational changes across partnerships. When the Road Safety Grant was abolished in 2010, some partnerships chose to reduce or cease camera enforcement, with changes to funding structure and pressure to
reduce costs during the recession. At the same time, more diversion courses were created and national schemes introduced, reducing the total number of motoring offences.

**Figure 5.5: Number of motoring offences (Great Britain, 2006 to 2012) – Indicator 4.8**

![Graph showing the number of motoring offences from 2006 to 2012.]

Source: DfT (2014a: 179, Table RAS41001)

5.2.6 Whether people feel safe cycling (Indicator 6.1)

There are two indicators which are intended to measure whether people feel safe cycling: the percentage of cyclists who agreed that it was too dangerous for them to cycle on the roads, and the percentage of cyclists who said that they felt fairly or very confident cycling on the roads. These are based on questions in the *British Social Attitudes Survey: Public attitudes towards Transport* (DfT, 2012b: 18, para 3.1). For the first, data for 2011-13 shows an increase (from 45% to 48%) in cyclists who agreed that it was too dangerous to cycle on the roads. The second indicator has been discontinued as the question is no longer in the *British Social Attitudes Survey*.

5.2.7 Whether people feel safe walking (Indicator 6.2)

According to *Reported Road Casualties Great Britain*, this indicator is still “under development”, as there has been difficulty in finding a suitable data source to measure whether people feel safe walking.
5.2.8 Seat belt wearing and mobile phone use

Wearing a seat belt and not using a mobile phone while driving are widely accepted as being important to road safety. Although not included as Framework indicators, in February 2015 DfT published results of surveys conducted in England and Scotland (DfT, 2015c). These showed that:

Rates for seatbelt wearing by adults, front and rear, appear to have continued to increase while the wearing rate for child rear seat passengers in England apparently fell from 96% in 2009 to 91% in 2014 (DfT, 2015c: 21). However, the survey results are not directly comparable as a result of changes in the geographical coverage of the survey sites in 2014.

The proportion of car drivers observed using a handheld mobile phone in England in 2014 (1.5%) was relatively unchanged from the 1.4% observed in 2009, when the previous survey was carried out (DfT, 2015c: 37, Table A.4).

5.2.9 Conclusion

These non-casualty indicators were designed to “help Government, local organisations and citizens to monitor the progress towards improving road safety and decreasing the numbers of fatalities and seriously injured casualties on Great British roads” (DfT, 2011a: 72, para B.1). The use of intermediate safety indicators, such as compliance with speed limits, is consistent with a systems approach to safety management. It is difficult to conclude, however, that these additional indicators have provided the broader picture of road safety that was intended. Whilst these are published annually in Reported Road Casualties Great Britain, there is little sign that they have been much used by practitioners or government, and ministers continue to focus on the headline KSI figures.
Stakeholders were clear about the importance of road safety research and basing interventions on good evidence. When it comes to deciding upon road safety policy and the conflicting opinions which often accompany a scheme, in order to ensure that work undertaken will be successful and provide value for money in the current economic climate, “we need to look at the data… and just keep coming back to the evidence.” \(^{80}\) Within road safety implementation the use of data and analysis is a way to “get the balance right” in terms of which policies should be enacted, where gains could be made, and what schemes would prove economically viable. \(^{81}\) Therefore, research, data and analysis are central to understanding the direction in which road safety policy is likely to develop.

80  Freight Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
81  Older Driver Rep, Stakeholder workshop
6.1 Research

The road safety research commissioned and published by DfT is listed in Appendix D and online. This shows a slowdown in the quantity of research publications – unsurprising in light of the halving of the DfT road safety research budget, as was seen in Table 4.1; 34 projects were commissioned before May 2010 and have been published since; whereas only 14 projects have been commissioned since May 2010, of which six have been published and eight are ongoing.

Shareholders commented that the public sector has witnessed something of a “shared slowdown in the pursuit of new evidence”, and often policies are enacted without considering the evidence – an example of this is the removal of speed cameras.82 Another example is distracted driving, described by one insurance stakeholder as “completely revolutionising what we are seeing in claims”, yet no government data is available.83

Road safety researchers were critical that much of the DfT road safety research from before 2010 has been archived, making it more difficult to locate on the Government website.

The Road Safety Observatory was an initiative from central government and other stakeholders, including PACTS and the RAC Foundation, to provide an accessible and digestible online portal to data and research, in order to bridge gaps in knowledge.

6.2 Data and analysis

The UK has some of the largest sets of road casualty data in the world, and the breadth originating from police reports which are made using the STATS19...
form are impressive. Over the past few years a number of improvements have been made. These include:

- The presentation of the casualty data has become more accessible to the public, with greater use of graphics and summary sheets.
- For the first time, in June 2015, the casualty data was published with statistical significance tests. This allows the identification of “true” trends in the figures from changes that may have come about by chance year-to-year fluctuations.
- A review of the methodology for reporting drink drive deaths was undertaken. One of the outcomes of this review is that these figures are now published more frequently (DoT, 2014f).

Some stakeholders had concerns about the robustness of the STATS19 system. With the reductions in specialist traffic police, regular police officers are now required to collect the STATS19 data “and there’s no training… and they don’t do it consistently or correctly” as a result. In addition, little progress has been made in implementing the revisions to STATS19 procedures recommended by the Standing Committee on Road Accident Statistics in its 2008 review. This seems to be the result of reduced resources and delays in adoption of the hand-held CRASH STATS19 reporting devices by the police.

While STATS19 provides important information on all reported accidents involving injuries, it can provide only a limited amount of data that police officers are able to capture while carrying out their range of duties at an accident scene. In-depth data is also needed, and the UK took the lead for over 30 years by maintaining research teams whose job it was to make in-depth accident investigations into a subset of collisions occurring in selected regions of England. This data proved invaluable for understanding the cause of accidents and injuries and the effectiveness of solutions. That activity ended in 2010, but was restarted when the Road Accident In-Depth Studies (RAIDS) programme was initiated in 2012. RAIDS has rebuilt and trained two new teams who are now routinely making in-depth investigations – albeit at a slower pace than was previously possible – to build a research database permitting a range of studies to be undertaken into road, vehicle, human and injury factors. Stakeholders were hopeful that the incoming government would continue funding RAIDS so that new trends, including new vehicle technologies and possible changes in human behaviour and injury outcome, could be understood.

The project archiving police fatal road accident reports has ended. This was a valuable activity which captured and collated the detailed reports made by police forensic accident investigators across the UK. Stakeholders saw the end of the project as a retrograde step.

84 Child Safety Rep, Stakeholder workshop
An increase in open data systems is also a feature of the past five years. Since 2010 there has been a wealth of information available and it’s “getting to people more openly”, facilitating people in “using data in better ways”.\(^{85}\) It is outside government that there have been the greatest number of developments in road safety research and data analysis since 2010. Independent research has been carried out in the private sector, and the availability of the enriched road casualty data to road safety stakeholders via the MAST (Market Analysis and Segmentation Tool) programme has had an impact. Throughout the road safety field the “quality of the research... [has] increased massively”, and as a result of the increased availability of data “there’s been a big increase in research and evidence-based practice [in road safety], where people are thinking about what the problem is before they embark on a campaign.”

Within the private sector, vehicle-based telematics, which have the ability to capture in-depth observations about the vehicle and driving experience, is also expanding at a dramatic rate and offers the potential to better understand the “anatomy of the crash”.\(^{86}\) Newly developed black-box technologies are granting some insurance companies step-by-step crash data on vehicles installed with their devices. However, at present the research potential of this new data source is limited, as the details are kept between the insurer and their clients, with the Data Protection Act protecting the customer’s data from public viewing. Similarly, a wealth of such valuable data could be available for download from computer systems which have become commonplace in vehicles over recent years, but data ownership issues would first need to be resolved.

In conclusion, it is evident that there have been both advances and setbacks in relation to road safety research since 2010. The private and third sectors are playing increasingly significant roles.

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\(^{85}\) Pedestrian Rep, Stakeholder workshop

\(^{86}\) Insurance Industry Rep, Stakeholder workshop
The UK Coalition Government’s strategic approach, coupled with the focus on economic growth and expenditure cuts, has pushed road safety down the political agenda to a disproportionate extent. Road safety leadership and strategy at the UK level was seen by local authorities and stakeholders, surveyed in 2014-15, as weak and fragmented.
There is now far greater diversity in road safety strategy across the UK. The devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and London have been more ambitious and appear to have coordinated their road safety agendas across national, regional and local levels.

The absence of national road casualty reduction targets for England and Great Britain is seen as a key reason for a lack of focus on road safety at the local level within England, which has had negative consequences in terms of priority, resources and operational capacity.

The sudden introduction of localism to local authorities in England, unaccompanied by appropriate guidance or adequate resources, has led to reduced funding and a loss of experience, resources and manpower in road safety. While community expectations of delivery have risen, operational capacity has fallen.

The number of people killed or seriously injured (KSI) has reduced, but much more slowly since 2010 in comparison to previous years. The reductions have not been evenly distributed across the UK or across road user groups. Compared with the 2005-9 averages, London, Northern Ireland and Scotland have seen the largest declines in KSlS; Wales and England (excluding London) have seen the smallest declines. The numbers of cyclists seriously injured has risen.

Local road safety partnerships, which were previously an area of positive development in road safety efforts, suffered significantly in the early part of this period. There are signs that road safety partnerships are now regaining their capacity as a result of NDORS (the National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme) funding.

Joined-up working that links public health, sustainable transport and other sectors is welcomed by local road safety practitioners, but these arrangements are still bedding down, and effectiveness so far has proved variable.
UK Government road safety policies have focused on education and enforcement. The Department for Transport has completed its *Road Safety Action Plan*, which included some significant safety measures, such as legislation on drug-driving. However, stakeholders have questioned the impacts in the light of reductions in roads policing prioritisation and manpower. Some actions were shelved, notably the young driver Green Paper.

The casualty and road safety indicators established in the *Framework* have not yet been developed into the set required for proper management of performance, and government focus seems to have been largely on the headline KSI figures.

While central government research has been cut back, positive developments have occurred in terms of research and technology within the private and third sectors.

The new Conservative Government will no doubt want to develop its own road safety strategy. A new action plan will also be required. PACTS and the RAC Foundation urge the Government to review the trends since 2010, including the themes and information in this report, in order to devise an ambitious and effective road safety strategy for the next five years or more.

PACTS has updated the Government’s projections of road casualties in Great Britain. Despite a lower projection, it remains the case that unless more effective action is taken, one third of a million people will be killed or seriously injured in the period 2011-30, with an estimated prevention value of £110 billion (Mitchell & Allsop, 2014). This fact alone should be sufficient to focus minds of ministers when considering the Government’s future road safety policy.
Appendix A: Road Safety and the UK’s Devolved Administrations

Over the past five years there have been differing approaches to leadership from Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and London, with each jurisdiction personalising its road safety strategy. Unlike local authorities in England, the devolved administrations have a greater resource base, which has enabled them to support their increased autonomy.

Information is provided below on the road safety budgets of these devolved administrations to show the broad direction of spending on road safety since 2010. The figures have been provided by the administrations and compiled on varying bases so that comparisons between administrations may not be meaningful.

Northern Ireland

Strategy

Road safety in Northern Ireland is led by Department of the Environment (DOE). The main strategic document is *Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy to 2020* (DOE, 2013). It is based on the Safe System approach to safety management and has a central vision “to make a journey on Northern Ireland’s roads as safe for all road users as anywhere in the world” (DOE, 2013: 41, para 4.7). The strategy identifies education, enforcement and engineering, delivered by working in partnership with statutory and voluntary agencies and individuals, as central to reducing Northern Ireland’s road casualty figures. The strategy also states that the DOE and others should remain “flexible and adaptable... reacting quickly to developments and changes in the environment” of road safety (DOE, 2013: 5). There is strong ministerial leadership on road safety issues, including a subgroup of the Executive on which sit the Ministers of the Environment, Regional Development, Justice, Health and Education.

The strategy establishes four road casualty reduction targets, to be achieved by 2020 against the baseline of the 2004-8 average. These targets are

- a 60% reduction in the number of people killed in road collisions;
- a 45% reduction in the number of people seriously injured;
- a 55% reduction in the number of children (aged 0-15) killed or seriously injured(KSIs); and
- a 55% reduction in the number of young people (aged 16-24) killed or seriously injured.
Actions

Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy contains 222 actions along with key performance indicators to track the progress of road safety implementation (DOE, 2013: 101). Northern Ireland’s Road Safety Strategy to 2020: Annual Report 2013 reported that of the 222 actions identified within the strategy, 68 (92%) of the 74 short-term actions had been completed or embedded in “business as usual” (DOE, 2014: 21). Of the other 6 short-term actions, 5 were noted as completed at the time of publication in 2014, with the final action “anticipated” as being complete by the end of 2014. The report noted that there had also been progress in the longer-term actions, with 34 medium-term and one long-term action being completed or embedded as “business as usual” by the end of 2013.

In 2014 DOE Minister Mark Durkan introduced the Road Traffic (Amendment) Bill to the Northern Ireland Assembly. This included a package of measures designed at tackling drink-driving, including reductions in the drink-drive limit and a new graduated driver licensing regime for learner and novice drivers. The Bill has been scrutinised by the Assembly’s Environment Committee, and has been returned to the Assembly for its Consideration Stage. The measures to reduce the drink drive limit have been accepted by the Assembly but aspects of the graduated driver licensing proposals are undergoing further review.

Resources

Within the Road Safety Strategy, the need to “implement the Strategy with limited resources” is clearly stated (DOE, 2013: 27, para 3.1). Policy is therefore to be targeted to ensure the best implementation with the funds available. For example, one of the 222 measures (Measure 144) laid out in the Road Safety Strategy is the need for “a review of Road Safety Education services and resources to ensure that they appropriately address today’s road safety issues” (DOE, 2013: 94). In terms of resources available to the Northern Ireland Executive for the implementation of road safety, £82 million was spent by relevant Government Departments in the period 2013/14, nearly £2 million less than the previous year (DOE, 2014: 24). Over the period since 2010, resources available for road safety increased from £74 million in 2009/10 to £84 million in 2014/15.

Casualties

The DOE reports promising signs in casualty reductions (Table A.1). In 2012 Northern Ireland experienced its lowest number of road deaths (48) since their records began, while in 2013 there were record lows in seriously injured casualties and the number of child and young people KSIs in road collisions (DOE, 2014: 9). In 2014 there were further record lows for serious injuries and

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87 A further 23 actions were added to the Strategy since the initial publication, which lists 199.
child KSIs (PSNI, 2015: 2). Furthermore, between 2009 and 2013 there was a 32% fall in KSIs on the country’s roads (PSNI, 2014: 4, Figure 3). However, Northern Ireland saw rises in road deaths and road traffic collisions in both 2013 and 2014 (PSNI 2015: 5, Table 1).

Table A.1: Northern Ireland: road safety targets and progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004-8 average</th>
<th>2014 actual</th>
<th>2020 target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People killed</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>79 (-37%)</td>
<td>50 (-60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People seriously injured</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>710 (-36%)</td>
<td>611 (-45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children (aged 0-15 years) killed or seriously injured</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>70 (-45%)</td>
<td>58 (-55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people (aged 16-24) killed or seriously injured</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>208 (-43%)</td>
<td>165 (-55%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DOE (2014); and PSNI (2015: 4)

Research and monitoring

The Road Safety Strategy emphasised the benefits of an effective research programme contributing “towards arriving at a proper understanding of road safety problems and issues” (DOE, 2013: 33, para 3.17). The strategy document included a number of actions relating to research and development, chief of which was Measure 174 which committed the DOE to considering “the creation of a comprehensive research programme” by 2020 (DOE, 2013: 97). According to the 2013 Annual Report on the road safety strategy’s progress, 23 new action measures have been added to the strategy as a result of completed research projects since 2011 (DOE, 2014: 5).

Scotland

Strategy

The key strategic document is Scotland’s Road Safety Framework to 2020, launched in 2009. This sets out a vision of “a steady reduction in the numbers of those killed and those seriously injured, with the ultimate vision of a future where no one is killed on Scotland’s roads and the injury rate is much reduced” (Scottish Government, 2009: 5). The document identifies priorities on which Transport Scotland would focus its efforts until 2020. These priorities are leadership; sharing intelligence and good practice; rural roads; seatbelts; children; drivers aged 17-25; drink-drive and speed.
The Road Safety Framework highlights four major casualty reduction targets for 2020 (with mid-way figures for 2015) relative to the 2004-8 casualty averages. The targets are:

- 40% reduction in the numbers killed on Scotland’s roads;
- 55% reduction in serious injuries;
- 50% reduction in the number of children (aged <16) killed; and
- 65% reduction in those seriously injured from that age group.

A previous Transport Scotland target of a 10% reduction in the slight casualty rate is also continued.

**Actions**

Scotland’s Road Safety Framework summarises 96 commitments for Transport Scotland to focus on in pursuit of safety on Scotland’s roads (Scottish Government, 2009: 105-112). The extent to which these commitments have been achieved is regularly assessed in the Road Safety Framework: Annual Report, produced by Transport Scotland every year since 2010. The most recent of these reports, Road Safety Framework Annual Report: 2013 stated that of the 96 commitments: 36 had been “completed and delivered”; 32 were continuously running; 21 had been started; 5 had been achieved but would need to be revisited annually; and 2 had yet to be started (Transport Scotland, 2014: 22). The report noted that the delivery of the 96 commitments was well underway.

Transport Scotland is undertaking a strategic mid-term review of the Framework during 2015. Together with partners they will make an assessment of the progress made since 2009 and a consideration of whether the priorities set in 2009 will remain the priorities through to 2020 or whether there should be refocus of the priority areas.

The Scotland Act 2012 gave the Scottish Parliament significant new regulatory powers regarding road safety. The Act provided Scottish ministers with the power to set national speed limits for Scotland and associated vehicle speed limits. It also provided the power to set the drink-drive limit for Scotland (section 8 of the Road Traffic Act 1988). In December 2014 the Parliament passed legislation to reduce the legal alcohol limit from 80 mg to 50 mg in every 100 ml of blood, making it lower than the limit in the rest of the UK. This came into effect in January 2015. The Smith Commission Report, published in November 2014, recommended that the “remaining powers to change speed limits will be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. Powers over all road traffic signs in Scotland will also be devolved.” (Smith Commission, 2014: 21, para 66).

Further information on recent activities by Transport Scotland is available in their Road Safety Framework Annual Report 2014 (Transport Scotland, 2015a).
Resources

The Annual Report: 2013 indicates that funding is limited owing to the economic climate (Transport Scotland, 2014). There have been attempts at inter-departmental partnership and connecting various funding streams, such as The Innovation Fund (launched by Transport Scotland in 2012), which makes small amounts of money available to part-fund local road safety pilot projects relevant to the Road Safety Framework and the national agenda. Transport Scotland has also supported and part-funded various local road safety projects including the City of Edinburgh Council’s 20 mph limit pilot, and Glasgow City Council’s programme to improve occupational road safety amongst local small and medium-sized enterprises, “Drive Safe – It’s Your Business” (Transport Scotland, 2014: 27).

Funding support to local government is provided by way of a block grant from the Scottish Government. It is a matter for individual authorities themselves to decide how to allocate the resources at their disposal, including those for road safety measures, based on their own local needs and priorities, having first satisfied their statutory responsibilities.

Since 2010, Transport Scotland has invested significantly in road safety initiatives; such as on the trunk road network; in major infrastructure projects including the A9 and the Queensferry Crossing; on the Scottish Safety Camera Programme; in active travel initiatives to help keep cyclists and pedestrians safe; and in national road safety publicity campaigns and education.

Casualties

The number of people killed on Scotland’s roads has decreased by 31%, from an average of 292 in 2004-8 to 200 in 2014 (Table A.2). There have also been significant downward trends in serious and slight injuries on the roads, although the trends are not uniformly downwards (Transport Scotland, 2015c).
Table A.2: Scotland – road safety targets and progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004-8 average</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020 target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>200 (-31%)</td>
<td>175 (-40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seriously injured</td>
<td>2,605</td>
<td>1,694 (-35%)</td>
<td>1,172 (-55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children killed</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6* (-60%)</td>
<td>8 (-50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children seriously injured</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>171 (-47%)</td>
<td>114 (-65%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2012-2014 average: Transport Scotland measure progress for this indicator using a three-year average.
Source: Transport Scotland (2015a: 23); and Transport Scotland (2015b)

Research and monitoring

Transport Scotland seeks “to ensure that policy debate is informed by the best research evidence and thinking”. Transport Scotland has commissioned reports on a range of road safety topics since 2010, including reducing blood alcohol limits, and parental influence on young drivers. These have been used to support the actions noted above.

It is unclear at present whether any detailed research will be undertaken into the impact of the reduction in the blood alcohol legal limit.

Wales

The Welsh Government has fewer devolved regulatory powers over road safety than Scotland or Northern Ireland.

Strategy

The primary strategy document for Wales is the Road Safety Framework for Wales (2013), which “sets out the Welsh Government’s priorities for road safety” (Welsh Government, 2013). The Road Safety Framework highlights a vision for road safety as: “a continued reduction in the number of people killed and seriously injured on Welsh roads, with the ultimate aspiration of no fatalities” (Welsh Government, 2013: 1, para 7); although expressly stating that this is not a specific target for casualty reduction, it acknowledges that it expresses an ambition that the Welsh Government hopes to make a reality.
The *Road Safety Framework* identifies the high risks to vulnerable road users and the primary causes of collisions, including drink- and drug-driving; speed; careless driving and driver distraction. Actions are aligned accordingly and focused on achieving casualty reductions.

The Welsh Government has targets in its *Road Safety Framework*: these “*allow us to gauge progress over time towards our collective objectives*” (Welsh Government, 2013: 2, para 12) and provide a means with which to measure the outcomes of different approaches. The strategy document introduces three casualty reduction targets central to the Welsh Government’s road safety policy until 2020. These targets, which measure reductions by comparison with the 2004-8 averages, are:

- a 40% reduction in KSI casualties by 2020;
- a 25% reduction in motorcyclist KSI casualties by 2020; and
- a 40% reduction in young people (16-24) KSI casualties over the same period.

**Actions**

The *Framework* advocates a partnership approach to achieving the targets, utilising different resources and expertise, and adopting similar approaches to road safety interventions. The *Framework* takes an outcome-based approach to its application of road safety, focusing on impact and effectiveness (Welsh Government, 2013: 25, para 125). Its actions have focused primarily on the three Es of education, engineering and enforcement. Although not a *Framework* action, the introduction of 20 mph limits has had a particularly high uptake by the Welsh local authorities.

The *Framework* recognises that the Welsh Government has fewer regulatory powers over road safety than the other devolved administrations, but identifies where it considers further powers should be devolved and where UK proposals for legislative change are supported.

**Resources**

The resources available in terms of road safety from the Welsh Government are considerable, with the (Welsh) Department for Economy, Science and Transport responsible for providing local authorities with capital and revenue funding for road safety interventions through the Road Safety Grant, part-funding for safety camera enforcement and support for the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents in Wales. Since 2000 the Welsh Government has contributed more than £135 million towards road safety in Wales.
Casualties

By 2013 there had been a 19% reduction in total KSIs against the 2004-8 average (Table A.3). However, in 2013 KSIs increased by 11% on 2012 figures (Welsh Government, 2014: 3, Table 1), and there was a further increase in 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A.3: Wales – road safety targets and progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed or seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-8 average: 1,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 actual: 1,263 (-10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 target: 884 (-40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcyclists killed or seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-8 average: 257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 actual: 282 (+10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 target: 193 (-25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people (16-24) killed or seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-8 average: 396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 actual: 272 (-31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 target: 237 (-40%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Welsh Government (2013: 14, Table 8; 20, Table 15); and Welsh Government (2015: page 3, Table 1)

Research and monitoring

The Framework for Wales stipulates that all road safety engineering and enforcement activity should be based on quantitative collision and casualty data and be evaluated to establish effectiveness in reducing casualties and collisions. Whilst recognising that it is more difficult to ascertain the effect education has on casualty reduction, the evaluation of education and training to determine effectiveness is also supported, with a focus on using resources from across Wales, the UK and internationally that have been subject to evaluation and been proven to be effective, and on replicating successful approaches.

The Welsh Government has recently run an innovation competition to identify technologies that can help to meet the target for reducing motorcyclist KSIs. The intention is to support four projects in the initial feasibility phase, which will be completed by the end of 2015.

London

Strategy

The Greater London Authority (GLA) has continuously highlighted road safety as a priority area, with backing from both the Mayor and Transport for London (TfL). The Mayor’s Transport Strategy (GLA, 2010a) emphasises the need “to help people get from a to b as quickly, safely and conveniently as possible”
and identifying road safety as a key component in one of the strategy’s six key goals (GLA, 2010b: 8). This message from the GLA has been supported by the TfL strategy document Safe Streets for London: Road Safety Action Plan for London 2020 (TfL, 2013a).

The Road Safety Action Plan indicates that the main casualty reduction target for TfL is to reduce the number of individuals killed or seriously injured on London’s roads by 40% by 2020 against the 2005-9 average (TfL, 2013a: 28, para 3.3). The plan describes this as a reduction of 10,000 casualties in real terms (TfL, 2013a: 5) and pledges to work with stakeholders and road safety partners to achieve the goal. Particular attention is given to cyclist safety in accordance with the Mayor’s Vision for Cycling (TfL, 2013b). In June 2015 the Mayor increased the KSI casualty reduction target to 50% (see below).

**Actions**

The Road Safety Action Plan sets out TfL’s approach towards road safety to 2020 under the headings of understanding the challenge; the way forward; safe roads; safe vehicles; safe people; and delivering in partnership (TfL, 2013a: 3).

TfL’s plan is based on the Safe System approach. Their Cycle Safety Action Plan states (TfL, 2014a: 5):

“The principles of the ‘safe system’ approach underpin Safe Streets for London. This plan takes into account that people make mistakes; that there are physical limits to what the human body can tolerate; and that road safety is a shared responsibility. All road users should be mindful of their own responsibilities about their own safety and that of others and we are working with different user groups to raise awareness of this.”

**Resources**

As a result of its status as a devolved administration and a capital city, London has access to considerable resources. The Road Safety Action Plan initially promised a doubling of funding available to support the planning, development and management of London’s roads under a road safety premise. TfL currently predicts that across the life of its business plan (which concludes in 2021/22) London will have invested £260 million in road safety. Road safety investment will be much broader than this in practice, as parallel programmes including Cycle Superhighways, Better Junctions, Borough Local Implementation Plan (LIP) schemes and the Freight and Fleet programme all contribute to casualty reduction. Furthermore, an additional £81 million has been added to the £19 million already invested in the Better Junctions programme specifically geared towards making junctions a safer place for cyclists (TfL, 2013a: 10).
In 2009/10 London spent £20 million on road safety.\textsuperscript{89} This increased to £29 million in 2014/15 and TfL predicts that this will increase to £47 million by 2015/16 (TfL, 2014b).

\section*{Casualties}

On the basis of 2014 casualty data, London was on track with its casualty reduction target. There was a reduction of 40\% (1,163) in total KSIs between the 2005-9 average (3,627) and 2014 (2,167), achieving TfL's target for 2020 of 40\%. As a result of this success the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, announced that the target is to be extended to a 50\% reduction by 2020 (TfL, 2015). Cyclist KSIs, however, increased by 3\% during this period (TfL, 2015: 2, Table 2).

\begin{table}[htb]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
 & 2005-9 average & 2014 actual \small{(-40\%)} & 2020 target \small{(-50\% extended)} \\
\hline
Killed or seriously injured & 3,627 & 2,167 & 1,084 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{London – road safety target and progress}
\label{tab:casualties}
\end{table}

Source: TfL (2013a: 28); and TfL (2015: 2, Table 2)

\section*{Research and monitoring}

The \textit{Road Safety Action Plan} states that use of evidence is “central to making London’s roads safe” (TfL, 2013a: 25, para 2.4). TfL has commissioned, and undertaken in-house, a considerable volume of road safety research. This has led to closer working relationships with the several research institutions. TfL has linked casualty data (STATS19) with London travel survey data and provided open data sources for the public and London Borough Councils.

\begin{quote}
“TfL’s attitude towards research is much more engaged, with an approach that’s based on evidence and looking for where they can get the best returns and what the evidence points to.”\textsuperscript{90}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{89} Major of London, Boris Johnson, answer to London Assembly Question from Jenny Jones, 19 May 2010: see http://mqt.london.gov.uk/mqt/public/question.do?id=31105

\textsuperscript{90} Road Safety Researcher, Stakeholder workshop
Appendix B: Local Authorities Survey Results

Survey method and response

An online survey consisting of 25 questions was created to gauge the opinions of local authorities in England (excluding London) about road safety since 2010. It was disseminated via an email link sent directly to members of the Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning & Transport's (ADEPT) Transport Board, the Local Government Technical Advisers Group (TAG) and Road Safety Great Britain (RSGB) in early February 2015. Reminders were sent and the survey was closed on 16 March 2015. This produced a sample of 34.

- In all, 34 councils responded (4 councils responded twice – making 38; the duplicates were checked for consistency with the previous response and excluded from the analysis).
- Of the 34 responses, 12 (35%) were from unitary authorities, 10 (29%) were from metropolitan authorities, 9 (26%) were from county councils, 1 (3%) from a county Fire and Rescue service and 2 (6%) did not say. One authority responded on behalf of the metropolitan county.
- In terms of political control, 34% were Conservative, 50% were Labour, 3% were Liberal Democrats, 3% Independent and 9% No Overall Control (where the major party was Conservative).

To put the response in context, in England, excluding London, there are 27 two-tier county councils; 56 unitary councils; and 36 Metropolitan Borough Councils where road safety may be managed by a joint or combined authority (LGA, 2011). Therefore, the responses received from these 34 councils represents over a quarter of all councils with road safety responsibilities.

Results

Q1. Thinking about road safety IN YOUR COUNCIL since May 2010, please rate the changes in the following areas.

Overall, locally there is some positivity about actions to improve road safety and there has been little change in research, data and analysis. However, 70% of respondents felt that changes in resources and capacity in their council had been negative since 2010. There was also negativity about road safety overall and trends in casualties and safety indicators.
Figure B.1: Road safety in your council

Table B.1: Road safety in your council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly positive</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Strongly negative</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions to improve road safety</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>13 (38%)</td>
<td>8 (24%)</td>
<td>8 (24%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, data and analysis</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>16 (47%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and capacity</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>12 (35%)</td>
<td>12 (35%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in casualties and safety indicators</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>11 (32%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>18 (53%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road safety overall</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>12 (35%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q1(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

The following comments related to the first question.

Trends in casualties / safety indicators have been mixed in recent years and it is quite difficult at present to gauge the significance of the changes observed.

We have no capital funds for road safety schemes – as such there have been few sites addressed.

[We have experienced] loss of the road safety schools training team, loss of publicity and marketing budgets, loss of school-crossing patrols, reduction in capital grant to address safety schemes, staff reductions resulting in loss of experience.

Overall, casualty numbers have decreased but there has been an increase in KSIs.

We remain committed to road safety interventions – educational, engineering and enforcement – but resources and capacity have been significantly reduced since 2010. Casualty trends are variable: although we are generally on the right downward trend, cyclist and motorcyclist casualties remain higher than we would like, and KSIs over the last year are showing an increase higher than the national average.

Road safety is slowly becoming a passing thought and even the associated name is likely to be absorbed into a generic ‘Highways’, which means it will soon disappear.

[We have experienced] reduced numbers of staff for delivery of school road safety and dedicated resource for road safety campaigns.

Casualties have risen slightly in recent years.

Central resources within the Partnership have increased, funded by the surplus revenue from the delivery of driver improvement courses. However, any increases centrally have only contributed towards filling the losses resulting from cuts in local authority road safety resources. This has meant reductions in some areas of road safety education, training and publicity delivery across the area, which may have, in part, contributed towards the slowing of casualty reductions. It should be recognised however that, as the Strategic Framework for Road Safety (SFRS) does not introduce any significant new initiatives, trends in collisions and casualties were never likely to continue at previous rates.

[There has been] loss of the road safety function as staff were made redundant and budgets cut.

Q2. Thinking about ROAD SAFETY IN GENERAL in England since May 2010, please rate the changes in the following areas.

33 respondents answered all parts to this question, with 34 answering all but the ‘Actions to improve road safety’ and ‘Resources and capacity’ elements. Overall, the picture is strongly negative, with 76% seeing changes in national leadership and strategy since 2010 as negative, 60% being negative concerning actions to improve road safety, up to 85% seeing negative changes in resources and capacity, and 47% believing that change in research, data and analysis has been negative. Almost two thirds of respondents were negative or strongly negative about road safety overall.
Figure B.2: Road safety in general

![Bar chart showing the distribution of responses for Leadership and strategy, Actions to improve road safety, Resources and capacity, Trends in casualties and safety indicators, Research, data and analysis, and Road safety overall.]

Table B.2: Road safety in general

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Strongly positive</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Strongly negative</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership and strategy</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>16 (47%)</td>
<td>10 (29%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions to improve road safety</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>14 (42%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources and capacity</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (39%)</td>
<td>15 (45%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in casualties and safety indicators</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>8 (24%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>18 (53%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research, data and analysis</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>9 (26%)</td>
<td>15 (44%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road safety overall</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>17 (50%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q2(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

The following comments related to the second question.

Staff resources have been reduced; ETP [education, training and publicity] staff have been reduced from 5 to 2.2.

The Strategic Framework for Road Safety lacks targets and specific actions, which has led to a perceived downgrading of importance. Also there has been an overemphasis on economic growth.

Not having a really strong national strategy does have an impact on how senior managers and elected members rank road safety against other priorities.

Road safety is generally collapsing and the few resources there are left are getting diverted to more general activities.

Lack of DfT national publicity output has significantly reduced public awareness of issues.

[There is a] lack of clear national targets and lack of clear leadership. It is not possible to easily compare different local authorities, which the Government was relying on. There is a lack of central government-commissioned research and pilots. Instead it seems that TfL is taking the lead instead (e.g. PEDEX crossings [pedestrian-operated crossings with a sensor or a countdown], segregated cycling facilities and trials of new junction facilities for cyclists).

Road Safety Observatory site has been an improvement.

Government policies on road safety have been diluted. It is felt there is more emphasis on economic growth than casualty reduction. Government’s commitment to road safety is patchy and often consists of words and not deeds, e.g. no Green Paper on young drivers, ambivalence about the value of safety cameras and other technology, cuts in road traffic policing, removal of [the] Road Safety Grant, making it more difficult for councils to compete with other budget pressures.

Q3. How have the following themes in the Government’s Strategic Framework for Road Safety affected road safety delivery in your organisation since it was published in 2011?

34 respondents answered the question about the themes in the Strategic Framework, with the highest percentage of responses for most elements stating that they had ‘no effect’ on road safety delivery in their organisation. There were positive responses for remedial education for low-level offences and tougher enforcement for those who choose to drive dangerously. A quarter of respondents felt that increased local and community decision-making had affected road safety delivery negatively.
Figure B.3: Themes in Strategic Framework

- Better education/training for children and learners
- Tougher enforcement - dangerous and careless offences
- Making it easier for road users to do the right thing
- More local and community decision-making
- Remedial education for low-level offences
- Supporting road safety community with better tools
- Taking action based upon cost-benefit analysis
- Tougher enforcement for deliberately dangerous drivers

Key:
- Positive
- No effect
- Negative
- Not followed through
- Don’t know
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Strongly positive</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Strongly negative</th>
<th>Not followed through</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better education and training for children and inexperienced drivers</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending tougher enforcement to cover all dangerous and careless offences, not just speeding</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making it easier for road users to do the right thing and go with the grain of human behaviour</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More local and community decision-making from decentralisation and providing local information to citizens to enable them to challenge priorities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remedial education for those who make mistakes and for low-level offences</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting and building capability by working with the road safety community on better tools to support road safety professionals</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking action based upon cost-benefit analysis, including assessing the impact on business</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tougher enforcement for the small minority of motorists who deliberately choose to drive dangerously</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q3(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

The following comments related to the third question.

Devolving funds to local community groups and politicians has resulted in spending money where it is not required or where it should [not] be targeted. Enforcement has been reduced throughout the borough.

[There have been] cuts in funding for enforcement etc. Some legislation has been toughened but it has to be enforced and the perpetrator caught and the offence discharged. Cuts in budgets and the “don’t persecute the motorist with technology” (e.g. CCTV vehicles, cameras) policies do not help.

Many of the actions that are positive were already happening, others haven’t really occurred or have a negative effect.

Remedial courses have helped provide some needed funding. Allowing local/community decision-making would be sensible if there were the resources to educate them with what their decision means – the actual result is that the problems have been ignored in favour of the most vocal people’s moans.

Providing more information to communities has not worked – instead the lack of national leadership and targets has resulted in a reduced commitment to road safety.

SFRS lacks targets and specific actions, leading to a perceived downgrading of the importance of road safety. Also there has been an overemphasis on short-term economic growth with little consideration of the longer-term consequences.

Q4. How have the Government’s principles and approaches set out in its Strategic Framework for Road Safety affected road safety delivery in your organisation since it was published in 2011?

34 respondents answered this question, where the only element deemed positive was related to stronger links between road safety, public health and sustainable travel. Many of the elements were considered to have had no effect, although the principle of deficit reduction was seen to have negatively affected road safety delivery for many respondents.
Figure B.4: Principles in Strategic Framework

- **Greater decentralisation of responsibility and power to local authorities**: 20%
- **Monitoring performance against the indicators in the Road Safety Outcomes Framework**: 40%
- **Over-arching targets not considered the most appropriate course for road safety**: 30%
- **Stronger links between road safety, public health and sustainable travel**: 50%
- **The Government’s approach to road safety: a “public health” problem-solving focus**: 60%
- **The Government’s central challenge of tackling the debt crisis and restoring sustainability to the public finances**: 70%

*Positive*, *No effect*, *Negative*, *Not followed through*, *Don’t know*
Table B.4: Principles in Strategic Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly positive</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>No change</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Strongly negative</th>
<th>Not followed through</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greater decentralisation of responsibility and power to local authorities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring performance against the indicators in the Road Safety Outcomes Framework</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching targets not considered the most appropriate course for road safety</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger links between road safety, public health and sustainable travel</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government’s approach to road safety: a “public health” problem-solving focus</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Government’s central challenge of tackling the debt crisis and restoring sustainability to the public finances</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q4(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

The following comments related to the fourth question.

There are still no links between road safety and public health practitioners. Devolving power to local communities has reduced the impact on addressing accident hotspots, with priorities shifting to perceived problems or winning votes.

Health funding is used to cover the cost of some road safety activities.

Decentralisation and localism is claimed, but power without authority and sufficient resources is useless. The Government’s principles are all “wishes”. We have changed our approach to try and accommodate these wishes but better leadership/more resources from Government are needed to make wishes come true.

There are a few separate points on this section. Our authority has kept local targets. Road safety education is a long-term investment in creating intelligent road users by providing education and skills to children from an early age. The impact of the reduction in capacity for education training and publicity may not be fully realised for some years. On a more positive note I think the closer links with public health and active travel are a really positive step forward.

The Government has abdicated responsibility without providing powers and funds to enable local take-up. Public health is rather an oil tanker; it takes a long time and considerable effort to achieve a change in direction.

NHS very blinkered.

The lack of targets means that road safety has become even less important for the decision-makers, and the public health focus has only been to find out what is happening rather than helping to keep it going. Removing funding has caused most dedicated road safety work to end. The others may have happened but they aren’t noticeable.

Q5. How important do you think these ‘Road Safety Action Plan’ achievements have been in terms of improving road safety?

33 respondents answered all of the questions, with one additional respondent answering some of the elements. Most of the elements of the Road Safety Action Plan achievements were considered to have been important, although the local authority performance comparison website was seen as the most unimportant.
Figure B.5: Road Safety Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A fixed penalty notice for careless driving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new offence: &quot;Causing serious injury by dangerous driving&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased penalty fines to £100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New drug offence laws and type approval of drug screening devices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Speed Limit circular and Speed Limit Appraisal Tool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatbelt wearing and careless driving diversion courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The English road safety comparison website</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road Safety Observatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table B.5: Road Safety Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Strongly important</th>
<th>Important</th>
<th>Neither important or unimportant</th>
<th>Unimportant</th>
<th>Strongly unimportant</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A fixed penalty notice for careless driving</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A new offence: “Causing serious injury by dangerous driving”</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased penalty fines to £100</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New drug offence laws and type approval of drug screening devices</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Speed Limit circular and Speed Limit Appraisal Tool</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seatbelt wearing and careless driving diversion courses</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The English road safety comparison website</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Road Safety Observatory</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q5(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

The following comments related to the fifth question.

The data in the local authority comparison [English road safety] site was variable in quality and incomplete, and without knowing that the information and budget calculations are based upon the same parameters in all areas, comparing the spend on road safety between authorities is meaningless.

Some of these have made good headlines whilst not actually being useful at a time when police numbers are reducing. The comparison website is of extremely little use. The Speed Limit Appraisal Tool is unsupported and actually useless.

The Speed Limit Appraisal Tool would be useful if we had the resources to deliver it.

Educational diversion courses have helped bring some necessary funding, which has been used to protect much of the road safety delivery in this area. Without it our road safety team would not exist. Most of the others have not really had any noticeable effect on road safety. The comparison site is meaningless as it just used high-level numbers which make meaningless comparisons. The Observatory would be useful except there is never any time to update it or use it.

We have never been able to get the Speed Limit Appraisal Tool software to work.

A fixed penalty notice for careless driving and increased penalty fines will only impact on road safety if it is possible to apprehend perpetrators in the first instance. As stated previously, dwindling budgets and a reduction in police on the streets mean that it is less likely that offenders will be caught and prosecuted/educated.

The first four points would be strongly important if more enforcement officers were available.

Q6. The main item in the Road Safety Action Plan that has NOT been implemented is a Green Paper on the safety of young drivers. How helpful would you have found it to your work to have had a Green Paper published?

34 respondents answered this question, with 82% stating that they would have found it helpful if the Green Paper on young drivers had been published.
Q6(a). Please provide further details or examples, if you wish.

[We] would hope that graduated [driver] licensing would have been introduced by now.
Graduated driving licence log books would have been useful tools and can only come from the centre.
We are working on delivering a new driving qualification and this would have helped promote it.

There is a wealth of good practice going on around the country, but no hint of legislative change, which is needed.

There is clear evidence elsewhere in the world that graduated licensing helps reduce road collisions and casualties associated with new drivers.

Central government need to show leadership and offer guidance in this critical area.

Young drivers are a priority road user group involved in road traffic collisions resulting in significant casualties. The Partnership has introduced a range of interventions to target this audience but we are approaching the limits of casualty reduction via these local initiatives. In order to make further significant reductions amongst young drivers, there needs to be national intervention. A young driver Green Paper and proposals such as graduated driving licences would have an impact at a national level. It is acknowledged that there may be political sensitivities, but without this leadership it is unlikely that we can make further progress with casualty reduction at a local level.
Q7. Does your organisation have a casualty reduction target?

65% of the 34 respondents stated that their organisation does have a casualty reduction target.

Q7(a). If Yes, please specify.

There were a wide range of responses to this question including:

- 40% reductions in collisions
- 20% reductions in KSI casualties from a 2010-12 baseline
- 4% reductions per annum
- 33% reduction in KSI casualties, using a 2004-8 baseline
- stretched joint Local Transport Plan targets
- 40% reduction in KSIs by 2020, based on the 2005-9 average
- specific road user targets for children, young drivers and motorcyclists

It shows that there are a variety of approaches, both in targets and in baseline periods against which changes are monitored.

Q8. Are there other actions or initiatives in the public or private sectors that have had significant positive impacts on road safety since May 2010?

The development of NDORS [National Driver Offender Retraining Scheme] courses has seen an increase in drivers/riders trained. This should be bringing about a huge reduction in casualties, but as yet we are not seeing this.

THINK! Campaign

The reduction in the number of roads policing officers has had an adverse impact on driver behaviour and the ability to enforce new traffic laws, and hence on casualty numbers.

Car industry has continued to innovate. ESP [Electronic Stability Program systems], better airbag technology, black box, and even driverless cars have a positive potential. Industry such as construction moving towards the use of safety systems mandated by local authority areas or employers, developers etc.

Use of driver awareness courses to fund road safety initiatives

Small-scale, local face-to-face training & education

Making Road Safety Pay report of the RSF [Road Safety Foundation]

The recession!

No

Public health commissioning processes

The cost-recovery process from speed awareness and other diversionary courses has provided a vital source of funding to sustain some road safety activities.
Chief Fire Officers Association Road Safety Executive Board working with partners and a Memorandum of Understanding with Road Safety Great Britain

None I can recall

The joining of Public Health with the LAs [local authorities] has provided a much-needed link between departments on joint priorities

The value of prevention rather than treatment should be better recognised. The Partnership aims to reduce the number of people injured in road traffic collisions on the roads and make the area’s roads safer. This risk-reduction element highlights the importance of freeing people from the dangers associated with motor vehicles which falls on vulnerable road users in particular. Nationally, Brake’s 20’s Plenty [for Us] campaign and Living Streets’ campaigns have both raised awareness of the vulnerability of pedestrians and proposals to improve road safety for this vulnerable group. Business, too, is starting to see the benefits of reducing the number of on-road incidents their vehicle fleet and employees are involved in. The Partnership has worked with a number of large employers in the area to highlight the need to better manage occupational road risk.

None that I am aware of

Learn 2 Live

Councils now actively contracting out road safety services leading to dilution and reduction in activity

Q9. What is the most important step the next government could take to improve road safety?

a) Review/improve quality of approved driving instructor teaching.

b) Review/create national planned and progressive programme of risk education for young people throughout all Key Stages; create robust and evaluated resources to support this programme; this would create equality of opportunity nationally.

Provide funding to address the outstanding issues.

There must be investment back into road safety, whether through revenue award into Local Transport Plans, a challenge fund to address particular issues, or through public health.

Provide ring-fenced funding.

Increased visibility of police traffic enforcement

Bring back targets.

More emphasis needs to be given to the importance of prevention rather than treatment. Similarly, greater emphasis needs to be given to the value of risk reduction and the importance of freeing people from the dangers associated with motor vehicles on vulnerable road users in particular. Government needs to lead on promoting, through local authorities, a Safe System approach to safer roads e.g. by adopting where appropriate the Dutch methodology.
Provide the framework and possibly dedicated funding to encourage road safety partnership between the police, local authority, Fire and Rescue, etc. to stay together and work together. Not to provide large budgets but enough to fund support to keep the collaboration going.

Graduated driver licensing

Show some leadership and some interest.

Stop the demise of road safety ETP; ring-fence road safety funding – engineering and ETP.

Increase funding to local authorities to enable retention of staff and development of road safety schemes.

To provide further funding to support road safety initiatives

Setting and monitoring road safety targets. These should be based on what is happening in the local area rather than a generic one for the whole country. I understand it will not mean more money from central sources but it would focus local organisations’ thoughts when deciding budget and resource allocations.

Resetting of national targets and focus

National targets and stronger evidence-based leadership

Provide some effective national targets for achievement.

Renewed focus and vigour around road safety – expressed by re-adoption of targets

Include national KSI and all-injury targets in the next iteration of the Strategic Framework instead of holding local authorities to account over performance based on other local authorities; it is meaningless. Targets have been shown to coincide with casualty reduction levels. The omission of targets is the single biggest mistake this Government has done to Road Safety (apart from the removal of the Road Safety Grant).

Issuing a Green Paper to consult on proposals to improve safety for young drivers and hence reduce casualties in this road user group, who are heavily over-represented in the casualty statistics. This would demonstrate strong leadership from government but would need to be backed up by a commitment to action, supported by funding with new targets to focus activity.

Take politics out of reducing death and serious injury on our roads. Give ring-fenced funding on a needs basis to address casualties in those areas that need it most. Produce road safety targets and monitor them against investment.

[Put] road safety education into the National Curriculum.

Increase budget and resources – many local authorities including ours no longer have a Road Safety Officer/Team. Staff reductions have been huge.

Aside from the obvious [points] of more funding and recognition, following through on promises of legislation (i.e. young driver Green Paper) to improve road safety would be a welcome change.

Take it more seriously! And reduce the money chucked at cycling! What about motorcyclists?
Provide a National Strategy.

Ring-fence local authority capital and revenue funding.

Young Drivers changes in legislation.

Specifically include road safety education in the curriculum.

Introduce national targets and specific Road Safety Grant funding.

Q10. Are there any other observations you wish to make?

Since the Coalition took control and the austerity cuts have been made, road safety and casualty reduction teams have diminished, budgets have been reduced and our casualties are starting to rise without any investment to redress the status.

1) A forward step is that road safety is not seen in isolation any more but is better integrated into active sustainable travel, highways maintenance etc. 2) There has been a lack of direction over the last five years. Now that we are starting to develop our systems to work with public health, NHS etc., things are improving, but its been frustrating and hard work to get here without much national guidance.

Our authority still strongly supports road safety at a councillor and officer level; funding has been maintained as well as it can be but overall spend has greatly reduced.

Action needs to be taken soon before road safety fades away.

The last five years have shown a lottery of fortunes amongst local authorities. Some have been devastated, others have survived well. I am thankful that mine comes within the latter group.

We have concerns about national schemes such as the ‘Managed Motorways – All lane running’ initiative, which does not include an objective to improve road safety but rather to ensure that road safety is ‘no worse off’. This reinforces our previous comments that economic growth is a greater priority to government than road safety. We feel there will be negative road safety implications as a result of government pursuing economic growth, without the resources to deal with increases in traffic levels.

Local authority resources are stretched.

Much of the casualty reductions seen over the last five years have been down to the financial collapse leading to people driving less and more sustainably (which, as a handy by-product, means more safely). I feel that as economic recovery continues we will begin to really see the effect that the lack of funding and central steer has had on casualty reduction.

The driving test needs to move from a pass/fail to an assessment-based system so that drivers cannot pass without a minimum amount of driving hours and demonstrating the skills over a period of time not as a one-off.

Road safety and casualty reduction is now a low priority for councils, police etc.
Appendix C: Trends in Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain

This appendix provides further details to Section 5. Although the majority of data presented here is for Great Britain, some data is also provided for Northern Ireland.

Figure C.1: Road casualties by year and severity (Great Britain, 2005-2014)

Source: DfT (2015b)

Road deaths and serious injuries

Table C.1: Road deaths (UK, 2005-9 and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Deaths 2005-9 average</th>
<th>Deaths 2014</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England excl. London</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>-40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total England</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>-33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Great Britain</td>
<td>2,816</td>
<td>1,775</td>
<td>-37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>-34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2,935</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>-37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2014a: 141, Table RAS30032); DfT (2015b: Table RAS30008); TfL (2015: 1, Table 1) and PSNI (2015, p.5, Table 1)
### Casualties by road user groups

#### Table C.2: Deaths by road user type (Great Britain, 2005-14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pedestrian</th>
<th>Pedal cycle</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>Motorcycle</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>3,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>3,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>2,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2,222</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,850</td>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,901</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1,754</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1,713</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2014a: 156, Table RAS30060; 2015b: 4, Table RAS30001)

#### Table C.3: Reported serious injuries by road user type (Great Britain, 2005-14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pedestrian</th>
<th>Pedal cycle</th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>Motorcycle</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6,458</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>12,942</td>
<td>5,939</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>28,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6,376</td>
<td>2,296</td>
<td>12,642</td>
<td>5,885</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>28,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,278</td>
<td>2,428</td>
<td>11,535</td>
<td>6,149</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>27,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>10,711</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>26,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5,545</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>10,053</td>
<td>5,350</td>
<td>1,136</td>
<td>24,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,200</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td>8,914</td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>22,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,454</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>8,342</td>
<td>5,247</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>23,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5,559</td>
<td>3,222</td>
<td>8,232</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>23,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4,998</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>7,641</td>
<td>4,866</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>21,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>5,063</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>22,807</td>
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Source: DfT (2014a: 156, Table RAS30060; 157, Table RAS30061; 2015b: 4, Table RAS30001)

#### Table C.4: Deaths by road user type (Great Britain, 2005-9 and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pedestrians</th>
<th>Pedal cyclists</th>
<th>Motorcyclists</th>
<th>Car occupants</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>All road users</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005-9</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>1,407</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2,816</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-38%</td>
<td>-43%</td>
<td>-34%</td>
<td>-37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2015b: 4, Table RAS30001)
Table C.5: Reported serious injuries by road user type (Great Britain, 2005-9 and 2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Road User Type</th>
<th>2005-9 average</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrians</td>
<td>6,145</td>
<td>5,063</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedal cyclists</td>
<td>2,398</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>+42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcyclists</td>
<td>5,776</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car occupants</td>
<td>11,577</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,329</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All road users</td>
<td>27,225</td>
<td>22,807</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DfT (2015b: 4, Table RAS30001)

Figure C.2: Deaths per billion passenger miles by road user type (Great Britain, 2006-2013)

Source: DfT (2014a, Table RAS41001)
Quarterly casualty data

Figure C.3: KSI casualties by quarter (Great Britain, 2005-2014)

Source: RSA, using MAST Online (data extracted 20 August 2015)
International comparisons

Figure C.4: International comparison of road deaths per million population in (a) 2010 and (b) 2013

Source: For 2013 data: DfT (2014e); for 2010 data: DfT (2012a: 232, Table RAS52001)

In 2014, Malta and Sweden had lower fatality rates than the UK, at 24, 28 and 29 deaths per million respectively. Norway also had a fatality rate of 29 deaths per million. The number of deaths in Malta is small and, as a result, small absolute changes in the number of deaths can lead to substantial fluctuation in the annual fatality rate (ETSC, 2015).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research title</th>
<th>Year commissioned</th>
<th>Year published</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue Risk Management Systems: A Review of the Literature</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding Public Attitudes to Road User Safety</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understanding Public Attitudes to Road-User Safety Literature Review: Final Report</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>A qualitative study of drinking and driving: Report on the literature review</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>A qualitative study of drinking and driving: Report on the findings</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitoring Speed Awareness Courses: Baseline Data Collection</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medication and road safety: A scoping study</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Characteristics of Speed-Related Collisions</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<td>Offenders and Post-Court Disposal Courses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of Police Road Casualty Injury Severity Classification: A Feasibility Study</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviews with Operators, Regulators and Researchers with Experience of Implementing Fatigue Risk Management</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Attitudes of Health Professionals to Giving Advice on Fitness to Drive</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expert Consensus Workshop: Driving Safety and Vascular Disease</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<td>Interim Evaluation of the Implementation of 20 mph Speed Limits in Portsmouth</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review of Effectiveness of Laws Limiting Blood Alcohol Concentration Levels to Reduce Alcohol-Related Road Injuries and Deaths – NICE review of blood alcohol concentration and road safety findings</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<td>DfT Citizens’ Panel Road Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fatal Road Crash Reporting System: Feasibility Study</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guidance for Drink-Drive Rehabilitation (DDR) Training Providers</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<td>Professional Skills for Delivering the Drink-Drive Rehabilitation (DDR) Scheme: Analysis of DDR Training Provider Organisations’ Interview findings</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional Skills for Delivering the Drink-Drive Rehabilitation (DDR) Scheme: Summary of Project Deliverables, Detailed Improvement Plans and Next Steps</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Research title</td>
<td>Year commissioned</td>
<td>Year published</td>
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<tr>
<td>The relationship between blood alcohol concentration (BAC) and breath alcohol concentration (BrAC): a review of the evidence</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship between Speed and Risk of Fatal Injury: Pedestrians and Car Occupants</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cycling, Safety and Sharing the Road: Qualitative Research with Cyclists and Other Road Users</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>The development of children’s and young people’s attitudes to driving: A critical review of the literature</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>Road Traffic Injury Risk in Disadvantaged Communities: Evaluation of the Neighbourhood Road Safety Initiative</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>The development of improvements to drivers’ direct and indirect vision from vehicles – phase 2</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
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**2011/12**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Research title</th>
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<th>Year published</th>
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<tr>
<td>Car drivers’ attitudes and visual skills in relation to motorcyclists</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudes to road safety: analysis of driver behaviour module, 2010 NatCen Omnibus survey</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Road user safety and disadvantage</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delivery of Local Road Safety</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon longitudinal study of parents and children: exposure to injury risk in the road environment and reported road traffic injuries in 13- to 14-year-olds</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue and Road Safety: a critical analysis of recent evidence</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children: Exposure to Injury Risk in the Road Environment and Reported Road Traffic Injuries in 16-year-olds</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
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**2012/13**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research title</th>
<th>Year commissioned</th>
<th>Year published</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle manoeuvres review: feasibility and safety implications of carrying out modified module 1 test manoeuvres on-road</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction: Understanding driver interactions with in-vehicle technologies</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yorkshire Crime and Casualties</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Not yet published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed Limit Appraisal Tool</td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAIDS (Road Accident In-Depth Studies) Programme</td>
<td>pre 2010</td>
<td>2013, ongoing</td>
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</table>
## Appendix D: DfT Road Safety Research 2010–15

### 2013/14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Novice drivers: Evidence review and evaluation of the New Drivers Act</td>
<td>pre 2010 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>A review of retesting and post-court educational interventions for serious driving offenders</td>
<td>2014 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commissioning syntheses for Road Safety Observatory</td>
<td>pre 2010 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motorcycle Compulsory Basic Training: Perceptions of Learners and Trainers</td>
<td>2014 2014</td>
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### 2014/15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driving Test Review</td>
<td>2014 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Young Driver Focus Group</td>
<td>2014 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation making careless driving a fixed penalty notice offence</td>
<td>2015 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation of 20 mph limits</td>
<td>2015 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug-Drive Evaluation and variation</td>
<td>2014 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Telematics: quantifying effectiveness in road safety</td>
<td>2015 ongoing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Drug-Drive Alternative matrices</td>
<td>2015 ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone &amp; seatbelt survey (statistical release)</td>
<td>2014 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of NDORS speed awareness courses</td>
<td>2015 ongoing</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

References


